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INTRODUCTION
No book has affected the study of modern French history in the last twenty-five
years more than Franc¸ois Furet’s Penser la Re´volution franc¸aise (translated as
Interpreting the French Revolution).1 Furet’s interpretation of the French Revolu-
tion and French history more generally, and the revisionism it inspired, are by now
well known. This essay interprets the intellectual career of Pierre Rosanvallon—
one of Furet’s most interesting students, recently honored by election to the Col-
le`ge de France, his nation’s most prestigious academic institution—as an attempt
to test the flexibility of Furet’s paradigm for understanding French history and its
amenability to new ends. Rosanvallon’s work responds to the most obvious limi-
tation of Furet’s project, both interpretive and political: its ambivalence about the
democratic project itself. The question Rosanvallon’s exercise prompts, however,
is just how fundamental a break with Furet’s model is required to write a history
of democracy that corrects for what seems to be an uncertainty about the viability
of democracy, especially about its extension. This essay argues that Rosanvallon’s
very attempt to operate within Furet’s framework in the name of a more democratic
vision unwittingly demonstrates some of the interpretive limitations of the premises
* This essay is a review of Pierre Rosanvallon’s career, marking the completion of his trilogy
on the history of French democracy: Le sacre du citoyen: Histoire du suffrage universel en
France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 2001), 490 pp., € 29.80 (original), 640 pp., € 13.50 (reprint); Le
peuple introuvable: Histoire de la repre´sentation de´mocratique en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1998,
2002), 379 pp., € 29.20 (original), 491 pp., € 8.00 (reprint); and La de´mocratie inacheve´e: Histoire
de la souverainete´ du peuple en France (Paris: Gallimard, 2000, 2003), 440 pp., € 28.20 (original),
€ 8.90 (reprint). Citations are to the original editions. The authors would like to thank Julian
Bourg, Warren Breckman, Vince Cannon, Aaron Freundschuh, Carla Hesse, Dick Howard, Martin
Jay, Rebecca Manley, Isser Woloch, and the anonymous readers for the Journal of Modern History
for their many helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.
1 Franc¸ois Furet, Penser la Re´volution franc¸aise (Paris, 1978); Franc¸ois Furet, Interpreting the
French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge, 1981). For admiring treatment of Furet’s
achievement, see Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France
(New Haven, Conn., 1993), pt. 3; and Tony Judt, “Franc¸ois Furet (1927–1997),” New York Review
of Books 44 (Nov. 6, 1997): 41–42.
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they share in studying the history of modern politics. Thus, Rosanvallon’s historical
work is best read, against his own intentions, as accumulating anomalies destined
to wreck, rather than reform, the interpretive paradigm for the history of French
democracy—and for thinking about democracy as a whole—that Furet originally
introduced.
Rosanvallon’s oeuvre has received scant attention in the Anglo-American world:
only his work on the contemporary welfare state, The New Social Question, has
been translated into English, in Princeton University Press’s series New French
Thought; and the lead volume of that series, which attempts to shape the reception
of recent French thought in the English-speaking world (and not simply to transmit
it), does not meaningfully feature Rosanvallon’s work.2 Study of Rosanvallon’s
intellectual program, however, makes clear the radical democratic impulse that
animates some versions of what has become known as French “neoliberalism”—
what makes certain of its strands distinctive rather than simply constituting a return
to the Anglo-American world of its own exported goods. To this end, this essay
begins by briefly explicating Rosanvallon’s career biographically, beginning with
the May 1968 radicalization of his youth and his subsequent political quest in the
1970s to give the post-1968 radical impulse both intellectual and institutional
shape. Rosanvallon’s itinerary, even when only partially explored, casts consid-
erable light on current debates about French cultural and intellectual life since
1968, especially the decisive and formative years of the 1970s. Rosanvallon fits
neither of the conventional narratives about post-1968 intellectual politics: neither
the dominant view of a slow maturation and embrace of market liberalism that
1968 is thought to have fostered nor the increasingly popular counternarrative
demonizing ex-leftists who, over the course of the 1970s, rejected their earlier
anticapitalist and anticolonialist politics in the name of a conformist liberalism.3
Instead, a brief study of Rosanvallon’s career shows that the animating intention
of his work—an intention with still unsurpassed relevance—began as and remains
the pursuit of a vision of liberal politics more open to the modern democratic
impulse. It is this goal that animates his entire historical project, from Le moment
Guizot, his groundbreaking and reputation-making thesis on Franc¸ois Guizot and
the post-Napoleonic school of the Doctrinaires, to his recently completed trilogy
on the history of French democracy.
This essay focuses on Rosanvallon’s ongoing attempt to formulate a robustly
democratic version of liberal politics from within what has long seemed to many
to be a historiographical paradigm constitutionally ambivalent about the viability
2 Rosanvallon’s La nouvelle question sociale: Repenser l’E´ tat-providence (Paris, 1995) is trans-
lated in New French Thought, the Princeton University Press series directed by Mark Lilla and
Thomas Pavel: Pierre Rosanvallon, The New Social Question: Rethinking the Welfare State, trans.
Barbara Harshav (Princeton, N.J., 2000). The inaugural volume of the series is Mark Lilla, ed.,
New French Thought: Political Philosophy (Princeton, N.J., 1994). For a recent overview of the
New French Thought series with important attention to its political agenda, see Martin Jay, “La-
fayette’s Children: The American Reception of French Liberalism,” SubStance 31 (2002): 9–26.
3 The most famous argument for the dominant view is Gilles Lipovetsky, “May ’68, or the Rise
of Transpolitical Individualism,” in Lilla, ed.; a good example of the counternarrative is Kristin
Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives (Chicago, 2002).
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of democracy itself. In Interpreting the French Revolution, Furet famously and
provocatively ascribed the causes of the Terror to the ideology of democracy. In
his analysis, the voluntaristic appeal to popular sovereignty, rooted in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s Social Contract and passed from actor to revolutionary actor as the
sole coin of legitimacy, inexorably led to the furies of the Terror. After pointing
to “the one notion that made Robespierre’s language the prophecy of a new era:
that democratic politics had come to decide the fate of individuals and peoples,”
in the next breath Furet charged “democratic politics” with the innate propensity
of violently “break[ing] its enemies’ resistance.”4 Establishing the “new god of a
fictitious community,” the Revolution reached a compelled finale in the Terror,
since Maximilien Robespierre’s “metaphysics was . . . not a parenthesis . . . but a
type of public authority that the revolutionary phenomenon alone made possible
and logical.”5 Furthermore, Furet argued, the French Revolution planted the seeds
of twentieth-century totalitarianism. “Today the Gulag forces us to rethink the
Terror,” he wrote, “precisely because the two undertakings are seen as identical.”6
Furet’s sense of the political consequences of this argument, however, seemed
to vary over time. Often Furet invidiously contrasted Anglo-American and French
traditions according to a logic of norm and deviation: Anglo-American “liberal”
democracy mastered “pure” democracy and thus avoided the violent excesses of
the French Revolution.7 In response to the point that American democracy had
also been founded—indeed, re-founded—in an extraordinary appeal to the con-
stitutive power of “the people,” Furet followed Alexis de Tocqueville in explaining
the Americans’ healthy development by the fact that they faced a blank slate (rather
than an Old Regime) at their founding.8 According to Furet’s narrative, it was only
in the 1870s that French positivists found a form of elitist democracy “close
enough” to Anglo-American liberalism finally to expunge the threat of terror (even
if intellectuals were not fully cured until his own generation’s difficult maturation).
But this rhetoric of health and pathology proved to be only one of the modes of
Furetian discourse. Other times, and more pessimistically, Furet rooted his rejection
of the French Revolution in a more general skepticism about democracy, even in
its more moderate forms. Indeed, Furet allowed, the threat of democratic renewal
eventually appeared even in that country that had done the most to master it. “At
the end of the twentieth century,” Furet wrote in his final work, “the critique of
democracy in the name of democracy is no less obsessive in the United States than
4 Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, pp. 26–27.
5 Ibid., pp. 193, 70.
6 Ibid., p. 12; translation modified. In this, Furet’s interpretation bears deep similarities to Jacob
Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952). This narrative has recently been
revived with the new end point of “Muslim totalitarianism” in Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism
(New York, 2003).
7 As a number of commentators have noted, this comparison invokes an implausible version
of English and American history. For a classic statement, see Isser Woloch, “On the Latent Illi-
beralism of the French Revolution,” American Historical Review 95 (Dec. 1990): 1452–70, esp.
1460.
8 See, e.g., Franc¸ois Furet, “L’ide´e franc¸aise de la Re´volution,” Le De´bat 96 (Sept.–Oct. 1997):
13–32; rpt. as Franc¸ois Furet, La Re´volution en de´bat, ed. Mona Ozouf (Paris, 1999), chap. 3.
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in France or elsewhere in Europe. Far from the American version of consensual
equality’s having informed the Europeans, it seems that the French revolutionaries’
obsession with equality seems to have taken over American society.”9 Aware that
the impulse to democratization would survive even his own disastrous century and
withering attack, Furet nonetheless prescribed no lasting way for democracy to
avoid its original shipwreck in terror and totalitarianism. Furet’s unhesitating nor-
mative judgment that “the French Revolution is over” left the difficult legacy of
determining how and why democracy could genuinely stabilize and whether
French history has shown the failure of one “voluntaristic” kind of democratic self-
rule or the dangers of democracy in all possible forms. In Furet’s work not just
revolutionary passion but also democratic optimism find themselves faced with
“normalization.” A politically motivated intervention, Furet’s impact on French
and Western political thought has often been effusively praised; but as time passes,
it is important to assess the possible limitations of Furet’s achievement for thinking
about democracy and its French history.
Rosanvallon’s formidable corpus offers an ideal vantage point from which to
take up this question: his strenuous effort to reorient Furet’s revisionist paradigm
is not only interesting in itself but also provides a test case of the flexibility and
future of that paradigm. Accordingly, after an exploration of Rosanvallon’s for-
mation as a historian in part 1 of this essay, part 2 will turn to an analysis of
Rosanvallon’s historical scholarship. A main goal of this essay is to summarize
his retelling of the history of French democracy in order to make it more accessible
to Anglo-American scholarship. To highlight its relation to Furet’s achievement,
the discussion is organized around the two major renovations of Furet’s approach
that Rosanvallon attempts: first, his extension of Furet’s pathogenic interpretation
of democratic “voluntarism” to liberal “rationalism” so that they are presented as
political accomplices rather than genuine alternatives; second, his search for cures
for the pathologies of these twin modern ideologies—cures that, we will argue,
have difficulty succeeding because of the all-encompassing lethality of the original
diagnosis. Of course, Rosanvallon’s original, democratizing intention outlives the
difficulties of his performance. But if the intention is to survive, further efforts
may have to begin elsewhere than in a historical theory that understands democracy
as a pathology waiting to happen.
I. FROM MILITANT TO HISTORIAN
In a recent interview, Rosanvallon recalls that an academic life had by no means
been foreordained for him: “I could have become a union leader; politics is what
the future seemed to have in store.”10 That Rosanvallon changed paths to one that
led him to the summit of French academic life is the result both of the intellectual
9 Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, trans.
Deborah Furet (Chicago, 1999), p. 10.
10 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins de traverse de la pense´e du politique en France,”
Raisons Politiques 1 (Feb.–Apr. 2001): 50.
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and institutional politics of the 1970s and of several decisive personal and intel-
lectual encounters, symbolized by the three mentors whom he acknowledged in
the Lec¸on inaugurale he gave when he began his tenure at the Colle`ge de France:
Paul Vignaux, Claude Lefort, and Franc¸ois Furet.
Born in 1948 and thus a charter member of the generation of 1968, Rosanvallon
began his career in the orbit of the Confe´de´ration Franc¸aise De´mocratique du
Travail (CFDT), the leading French trade union after the Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale
du Travail (CGT).11 While studying economics at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes
Commerciales (the business school among the grandes e´coles of the French edu-
cational system), Rosanvallon became involved in projects of the militant left,
presiding over the CFDT’s Jeunesse E´ tudiante Chre´tienne in his youth.12 He then
began his professional career as the CFDT’s economic counselor (1969–73) and
later became the founding editor of the organization’s journal CFDT-Aujourd’hui
(1973–77). Rosanvallon’s early affiliation with this solidaristic but noncommunist
movement is crucial for understanding his trajectory up to the present day.
His work in the CFDT seems, for a start, to have opened Rosanvallon to the
possibility of uniting intellectual and practical concerns, or, as he recently put it,
of reaching “the point where the distinction between knowledge and action van-
ishes.”13 In his Lec¸on inaugurale, Rosanvallon praised Vignaux, the well-known
medievalist and CFDT notable, for having shown a young militant that “a life
dedicated to the rigorous understanding of the world fully participates in creating
the conditions for changing it”—a lesson, he said, that led “in completely the
opposite direction from the itinerary of a large part of the 1968 generation.”14 More,
though, than sparking his interest in making the world open to reflection (which
it assuredly did), Rosanvallon’s experience in the CFDT sensitized him to the
contributions, both historical and potential, of syndicalism to French democratic
practice—an awareness, as we shall see, that fundamentally informed his historical
scholarship. The ideals that the CFDT championed in the years after 1968 were
more than proposals for democratizing the economy. For Rosanvallon, they
amounted to a renovation in thinking about democracy itself.
11 The CFDT had originated from the Catholic left, with intellectual roots in the religious
corporatism of pre–World War II European social thought, beginning as the Confe´de´ration Fran-
c¸aise des Travailleurs Chre´tiens in 1919 and eventually developing through a period of laicizing
“evolution” in the mid-1960s, when it took its new name and secular mission. See, e.g., Frank
Georgi, L’invention de la CFDT, 1957–1970: Syndicalisme, catholicisme, et politique dans la
France de l’expansion, with a preface by Antoine Prost (Paris, 1995).
12 In a recent informative interview (Pierre Rosanvallon, “Te´moignage,” Revue franc¸aise
d’histoire des ide´es politiques 2 [1995]: 361–76), Rosanvallon noted that he did not finish any
of his school years at the E´ cole des Hautes E´ tudes Commerciales thanks to student strikes and,
climactically, the May 1968 events. “Luckily,” he commented ironically, “I read on my own!”
(p. 375). This interview was part of a forum on the intellectual politics of the 1970s that included
Rosanvallon, Rony Brauman, and Alain Touraine.
13 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Towards a Philosophical History of the Political,” in The History of
Political Thought in National Context, ed. Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk (Cam-
bridge, 2002), p. 199.
14 Pierre Rosanvallon, Chaire d’histoire moderne et contemporaine du politique: Lec¸on inau-
gurale faite le jeudi 28 mars 2002 (Paris, 2002), p. 7. The lec¸on has been reprinted as Pour une
histoire conceptuelle du politique (Paris, 2003); citations here are to the earlier version.
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Dubbed the “other” or “second” left by its members and by sympathetic his-
torians, the CFDT—led, beginning in 1971, by Edmond Maire, whom Rosanvallon
advised on economic matters in the years following the staggering events of May
1968—quickly adopted the antihierarchical political ideal of autogestion (self-
management) into its post-1968 platform.15 As a word and concept, autogestion
had originated in the 1960s as a reference to the Yugoslav practice of worker-
elected management of industry.16 Only after 1968, however, did it gain widespread
ascendancy on the left, and Rosanvallon quickly made himself one of the most
important theorists of this libertarian and pluralist form of left-wing radicalism. “I
more or less became the CFDT’s official ideologue,” he recently recalled.17 While
autogestion—an elusive buzzword of the French left in the 1970s—included
worker self-management, it appeared to almost everyone to represent a new foun-
dational principle for organizing society as a whole, one that would break with
hierarchy and decentralize authority in all sectors of life. In L’aˆge de l’autogestion,
Rosanvallon’s 1976 interpretation of the ideal, he ventured a clarification and pro-
grammatic statement of what the new word and the movements swirling around it
should come to mean.18 He admitted that the fashionable neologism so far meant
little, but he promised that even more than portending the democratization of the
workplace, the principle of self-management would break through to an entirely
new conception of the democratic way of life. A self-managed society would adopt
a democratic experimentalism in all sectors—though, no doubt reflecting the
CFDT’s specific priorities, Rosanvallon made the democratization of the economy
the major focus of his book.19
The popularity of autogestion is understandable only against the background of
May 1968, which gave birth to a host of new social movements striving to burst
15 Herve´ Hamon and Patrick Rotman, La deuxie`me gauche: Histoire intellectuelle et politique
de la CFDT, new ed. (Paris, 1984).
16 Albert Meister, Socialisme et l’autogestion: L’expe´rience yougoslave (Paris, 1964); cf. Pierre
Rosanvallon, “The´orie et pratique de l’autogestion yougoslave,” CFDT-Aujourd’hui 5 (Jan.–Feb.
1974): 49–72 (“La Yougoslavie semble ainsi s’orienter vers ce qu’on pourrait appeler une socie´te´
libe´rale de type nouveau” [p. 71]). As part of his CFDT duties, Rosanvallon took several trips to
Yugoslavia and investigated other models for incarnating the autogestion ideal, such as Israeli
kibbutzim (Rosanvallon, “Te´moignage,” p. 364). Anglo-American theorists interested in more
democratic and participatory visions of the left (such as early twentieth-century guild socialism)
likewise turned to the Yugoslav experience at this moment; see, e.g., Carole Pateman, Participation
and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1976), chap. 5.
17 Rosanvallon, “Te´moignage,” p. 362.
18 Pierre Rosanvallon, L’aˆge de l’autogestion, ou la politique au poste de commandement (Paris,
1976), revisited in Pierre Rosanvallon, “Mais ou` est donc passe´e l’autogestion,” Passe´ Present 4
(1984): 186–95; “Formation et de´sinte´gration de la galaxie ‘auto,’” in L’auto-organisation: De
la physique au politique, ed. Paul Dumouchel and Jean-Pierre Dupuy (Paris, 1983); and La de´-
mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 385–87. Rosanvallon’s first book, published under a pseudonym, and
other early writings offered more traditional syndicalist analyses; see, e.g., Pierre Ranval [Pierre
Rosanvallon], Hierarchie des salaires et lutte de classes (Paris, 1972); “La revendication de salaire
dans les conflits,” CFDT-Aujourd’hui 1 (May–June 1973): 17–28; “Capitalisme et conditions de
travail,” CFDT-Aujourd’hui 2 (July–Aug. 1973): 68–77; and many others in CFDT-Aujourd’hui.
19 Rosanvallon, L’aˆge de l’autogestion, chap. 4 and pt. 2.
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the boundaries of traditional left-wing politics and priorities. As Rosanvallon re-
cently recalled,
People were very far from restricting their thinking to the topic of how to manage
firms. . . . [Autogestion] became the mot de passe of the 1970s . . . and involved the
emergence of a new conception of democracy. On three principal levels. First, it implied
the refusal and contestation of all centralized and hierarchical systems and in this sense
suggested the generalized extension of democratic procedures to the governance of all
of the different spheres of social life. It also motivated the search for a way of tran-
scending the procedural limits of traditional representative democracy. Finally, it cor-
responded to a new perception of the relation between public and private life, “self-
management” looking as if it were the corollary, at once legitimate and necessary, of
more specifically institutional reforms. . . . People began speaking, in a general manner,
of the self-management of everyday life [autogestion du quotidien]. (La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, pp. 386–87)20
Not surprisingly, the breadth and depth of this new ideal posed what one could
call the major intellectual and political problem of the 1970s in France: how to
square the new ideals with the existing practices of political life, especially the
traditional parties of the left. As the existing left and center-left parties began to
appropriate the banner of autogestion as their own, intellectuals activated by 1968
also searched for ways to transform existing political movements from within and
make them conform to the new ideals.
This search took place in many political contexts, and the newly constituted
Parti Socialiste (PS) came to be among the most important and consequential sites
of debate, one in which Rosanvallon soon became embroiled. Briefly put, the PS
became the site of a massive power struggle between what Rosanvallon and others
understood to be the “two cultures of the left,” embodied by the two contenders
for party leadership, Michel Rocard and Franc¸ois Mitterrand, but conceptualized
more generally as a stark choice between the emergent antihierarchical vision of
politics and the hierarchical, even “totalitarian,” politics of the traditional left (epit-
omized by Stalinism and imputed to the Parti Communiste Franc¸ais [PCF]). Ag-
gravated by a left-wing alliance intended to enable the cooperation necessary to
win power (which eventually succeeded with Mitterrand’s electoral victory in
1981), this dispute had wide-ranging consequences in intellectual life. Rosanvallon
did more than take sides in this dispute—he served as one of the major thinkers
and defenders of the autogestionnaire, antihierarchical alternative that Rocard rep-
resented in his bid for PS leadership.
It was in this atmosphere that Rosanvallon and many others on the left began
to present totalitarianism as the chief threat of modern politics. It is important to
emphasize here that despite the fundamental importance of this political context,
20 Rosanvallon adds: “Some did not hesitate to advocate the extension of this ideal to the police
and the army!” See also the Nov. 1977 issue of Le Nouvel Observateur, which covered a forum,
in which Rosanvallon participated, on social experimentation, entitled “Vivre a` gauche” (Living
on the left); cf. Rosanvallon, “La gauche et le changement social,” Faire 20 (June 1977): 17–18.
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and for all its relation to the interfactional disputes of the time, the political theory
of this period should not be reduced to ideological apology for the more purely
political aspects of the struggle for party dominance.21 The battle allowed hitherto
marginal thinkers such as Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis to come to the
fore as their long-standing opposition to communist politics gained new relevance.
For this reason, as the political theorist Dick Howard has argued in a recent book,
the attack in the mid-1970s on totalitarianism allowed for the germination of a
new and necessary kind of thinking about the nature of democracy in France, one
with considerable implications for politics to this day. This left-wing form of an-
titotalitarianism gave rise to a different but still radical left that properly abandoned
the eschatological, violent, and bureaucratic tendencies of traditional leftist ide-
ology in the name of democracy and pluralism as well as justice and equality.22
It is an early encounter with Lefort that seems to have led Rosanvallon to con-
nect the pluralism and experimentalism of the vague autogestionnaire ideal with
the emerging critique of totalitarianism.23 A student of the philosopher Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and editor of his posthumous writings, Lefort had long attempted
to turn the left away from communism, beginning with the movement he founded
and the journal he edited collaboratively with Castoriadis in the late 1940s and
1950s, Socialisme ou Barbarie. Lefort emerged from comparative obscurity in the
1970s as the pioneer of a long overdue need for the critique of communism, a
reputation confirmed by the publication of his enthusiastic interpretation of Alek-
sandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago.24 Lefort sparked for Rosanvallon, as for
a number of thinkers, the conviction that inherited Marxist theory lacked the re-
sources necessary for the kind of critique of hierarchy and defense of pluralism
and experimentation that leftist politics after 1968 seemed to demand. Lefort’s
21 Compare here Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals against the Left: The Anti-
Totalitarian Moment of the 1970s in French Intellectual Politics (New York, 2004). Faire, the
journal for which Rosanvallon most frequently wrote in the mid-1970s, likewise played an im-
portant role in this conjuncture: an intellectual organ of the PS during the period of the so-called
Assises du socialisme, it allowed Rosanvallon, along with other CFDT intellectuals, to join the
PS in hopes of infusing it with their antecedent autogestionnaire ideals or at least guarding against
PCF dominance in the left alliance. See Franc¸ois Kraus, “Les Assises du socialisme, ou l’e´chec
d’une tentative de renovation d’un parti,” Les notes de la Fondation Jean Jaure`s 31 (July 2002).
For Rosanvallon’s major contribution to Rocardian theory and the thesis that there were two
cultures of the left, see Pierre Rosanvallon and Patrick Viveret, Pour une nouvelle culture politique
(Paris, 1977); on this book, cf. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political
Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 37–42.
22 Dick Howard, The Specter of Democracy (New York, 2002). As Howard acknowledges,
however, the critique of totalitarianism paved the way for a variety of different political sequels,
some of which lead to a complacent neoliberalism while others may not.
23 Rosanvallon recently recalled (in “Sur quelques chemins” [n. 10 above], p. 50) that he met
Claude Lefort as well as Cornelius Castoriadis in the immediate post-1968 years as he solicited
their contributions for his CFDT journal.
24 See Claude Lefort, Un homme en trop: Re´flexions sur “L’archipel du Goulag” (Paris, 1976).
See Rosanvallon’s review of this book in Faire 12 (Oct. 1976): 41–42; as well as his “Les avatars
de l’ide´alisme,” Faire 3 (Dec. 1975): 37–41, an essay on Andre´ Glucksmann’s book La cuisinie`re
et le mangeur d’hommes: Essai sur les rapports entre l’E´ tat, le marxisme, et les camps de con-
centration (Paris, 1975), Glucksmann’s reading of Solzhenitsyn.
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narrative of modernity, generated through reflection on the deep-seated origins of
totalitarianism, suggested that totalitarianism emerged through the extirpation of
the political as such. In his thesis, supervised by Raymond Aron, Lefort had fas-
tened on Machiavelli as insisting on the inevitability of conflict, a tacit criticism
of the Marxist tradition for hoping, in the name of postpolitical unity, to transcend
division.25 Rosanvallon read Lefort’s thesis as early as 1972 and reacted favorably
to Lefort’s attempt “to consider the question of political emancipation from the
point of view of the ‘realist’ theorists of domination (Machiavelli, [E´ tienne de] La
Boe´tie, [Vilfredo] Pareto) [rather than via] Marx, for whom domination is above
all economic domination, from which political domination is simply a deriva-
tive.”26 As Lefort put the matter in an interview conducted by an avid Rosanvallon
for the journal Faire in 1978, Machiavelli seemed worthy of attention as “Marx’s
‘other’ . . . since he put power at the center of his thought.”27 Following Lefort’s
critique of Marxism’s blind spot, Rosanvallon argued that autogestion demanded
“the rehabilitation of the political” and therefore a rejection of the blind alleys of
utopia and technocracy, both of which hoped to transcend politics altogether. Lefort
always wrote in the name of democracy, but he insisted that totalitarianism be
understood as a political formation that emerged from democratic rule, a self-
destructive version of the modern quest for liberty, equality, and fraternity.
Rosanvallon’s desire to “rehabilitate the political” has endured as a central theme
throughout his career, down to the title of his chair at the Colle`ge de France,28 and
it prompted the most theoretically interesting prospect of his work in the 1970s—
the thesis that autogestion could be conceptualized as “a new form of political
liberalism” entirely separate from economic liberalism. In Rosanvallon’s account,
political liberalism had correctly placed limits on the state and responded to the
need for pluralistic flexibility but had “never solved the problem of adapting itself
to the technological and industrial changes that began to occur” and had thus
remained frozen in the eighteenth century. For this reason, in the nineteenth century
it “became mismatched to society, and could not transcend the limits of the ques-
tion of public and individual liberties for which Benjamin Constant became the
25 Claude Lefort, Le travail de l’œuvre Machiavel (Paris, 1972).
26 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins,” p. 50. La Boe´tie’s tract reappeared in 1976 in a col-
lective edition with commentary by Lefort and others; see E´ tienne de La Boe´tie, Le discours de
la servitude volontaire (Paris, 1976).
27 Rosanvallon and Patrick Viveret, “De´bat avec . . . Claude Lefort,” Faire 30 (Apr. 1978): 53.
Pierre Clastres, defender of “society against the state,” also cut an important figure at this moment;
see Pierre Clastres, La socie´te´ contre l’E´ tat: Recherches d’anthropologie politique (Paris, 1974);
and Samuel Moyn, “Of Savagery and Civil Society: Pierre Clastres and the Transformation of
French Political Thought,” Modern Intellectual History, vol. 1, no. 1 (Apr. 2004).
28 His chair (established in 2002) is entitled “Chaire d’histoire moderne et contemporaine du
politique.” In his inaugural lecture, Rosanvallon defined le politique, or “the political” (a term
that originates from debate within Weimar Germany and is contrasted in French with la politique,
or “politics”), as “a mode of existence of life in common as well as a form of collective action. . . .
To speak of ‘the political’—as opposed to ‘politics’—is to speak of power and law, state and
nation, equality and justice, identity and difference, citizenship and civility, in short of everything
that makes up a polity beyond the immediate field of partisan conflict for power, governmental
conflict from day to day, and the ordinary activity of institutions” (Rosanvallon, Chaire d’histoire
moderne et contemporaine du politique [n. 14 above], p. 11).
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ardent spokesman.” “It is up to the present age,” he wrote, “to discover political
forms well-adapted to a complex and developed society.” Thus the theory of au-
togestion would save elements of political liberalism from their original entangle-
ment with the defense of individual property and “bring Locke up to date.” But it
would also correct political liberalism by ensuring that liberalism did not restrict
itself to the negative task of precluding the state from predatory intervention in
society without also pioneering more positive means of creating a vibrant and
pluralistic civil society. As Rosanvallon concluded, while autogestion “inherits
from Marxism the critique of bourgeois society and from liberalism the principle
of reducing the state’s power and making civil society sovereign, it goes beyond
both.”29 Of course, autogestion, like the “second left” as a whole, promised far
more than it ever delivered—as Rosanvallon would later come to admit. But it is
decisive for understanding Rosanvallon’s later historical scholarship, especially his
history of democracy, to realize that he began his intellectual career with the im-
pulse to develop a new, democratic kind of liberalism.
During these years, Rosanvallon made the acquaintance of the final and profes-
sionally most important of the three mentors whom he acknowledged in his recent
inaugural lecture: Franc¸ois Furet. “The encounter with Furet,” Rosanvallon re-
cently recalled, “was a very important catalyst. . . . After he was elected president
of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1977, Franc¸ois Furet started
a small and informal group to reflect on political philosophy. . . . What made this
group special is that it linked together two different generations. There was the
generation of Franc¸ois Furet, Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoradis, Krzysztof Pom-
ian, but there were also, from the very beginning, Marcel Gauchet, Bernard Manin,
Pierre Manent, and myself.”30 This informal seminar became the nucleus of what
has been called in the United States “New French Thought.” Rosanvallon, thanks
to Furet’s patronage, soon arrived at the E´ cole des Hautes E´ tudes en Sciences
Sociales (EHESS) and began work on his thesis. Within the EHESS, Furet founded
the Institut Raymond Aron in 1985, which has since become the major organiza-
tional nexus for French neoliberalism in political thought and historical study and
which Rosanvallon has directed since the early 1990s.31 It was also during the later
1970s that Furet consolidated his striking and influential reinterpretation of the
French revolution. In an important article on the genesis and context of Furet’s
29 Rosanvallon, L’aˆge de l’autogestion (n. 18 above), chap. 2, pp. 41, 43–44, 48. Elsewhere,
he went so far as to claim that “to Stalinism, autogestionnaire socialism is the only positive
alternative” (Pierre Rosanvallon, “Les analyses du stalinisme,” CFDT-Aujourd’hui 21 [Sept.–Oct.
1976]: 61–89). In a later autopsy on autogestion, Rosanvallon wrote that it “allowed Tocqueville
and Locke to become part of the socialist pantheon—no mean feat” (Pierre Rosanvallon, “Au-
togestion [Dictionnaire d’une e´poque],” Le De´bat 50 [May–Aug. 1988]: 158).
30 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins,” pp. 51–52.
31 The Institut Raymond Aron subsequently became the Centre de Recherches Politiques Ray-
mond Aron. The main organ of this movement has been the journal Le De´bat, edited by Furet’s
talented disciple Marcel Gauchet, who trained under Lefort and published one of the most im-
portant antitotalitarian texts of the mid-1970s, “L’expe´rience totalitaire et la pense´e de la poli-
tique,” Esprit 44 (July–Aug. 1976): 3–28. On recent French enthusiasm for political theory, see
the useful article by Jeremy Jennings, “The Return of the Political? New French Journals in the
History of Political Thought,” History of Political Thought 18 (1997): 148–56.
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Interpreting the French Revolution, Michael Scott Christofferson has demonstrated
what many had long suspected: that this brilliant but exasperating work projected
onto the canvas of French history a fashionable critique of “totalitarianism” that
not only helped Furet overcome the ideological adventures of his own communist
past but also resonated with the goal of intellectuals of the independent left—such
as Lefort and Rosanvallon—to define a new and postcommunist vision of radical
politics. This conjuncture helps to explain the surprising and counterintuitive fact
that French historiography, under Furet’s influence, came to adopt a Sonderweg
obsessed with the nation’s exceptionalism at just the same time that the Sonderweg
had begun to falter in the German historiography that originally gave rise to the
term.32 In Furet’s work, a pathological vision of democracy takes center stage,
providing (whatever the author’s intentions) an easy stepping-stone to the thesis
that the aim of modern politics needs to be a liberal ordering of society that chastens
the necessarily democratic foundations of modern legitimacy in light of the support
those foundations easily provide to totalitarian and terroristic forms of rule.
It is certainly true that the intellectuals that Furet grouped around him in these
years, as Rosanvallon recently recalled, had “an absolutely central point in com-
mon: to reflect on the problem of totalitarianism and the problem of the political
more generally. . . . And while we came from different perspectives, we also shared
the feeling of an urgent task—which seemed decisive to everyone—of reappro-
priating the classics of political philosophy.” But from the beginning, the intellec-
tuals associated with New French Thought and French neoliberalism were not all
committed to a single project. In particular, not all were willing to renounce the
essential, democratizing aspiration of the left in European history. “Contrary to
what many thought, we were very diverse,” Rosanvallon recently argued. “Some,
like myself, were attempting an intellectual reconstruction of the left, while others,
like Pierre Manent, were classical liberals. . . . Manent says at the end of one of
his books on democracy that ‘one must love democracy, but only moderately.’ But
Castoriadis, Lefort, and I were hardly of that view.”33 The common rejection of
totalitarianism, in other words, provided a broad paradigm for creative differenti-
ation from Furet’s highly focused rejection of revolutionary terrorism and what he
saw as its sequels in modern history, and it is within this elongated paradigm that
Rosanvallon inscribed his own historical scholarship. Rosanvallon shared most
with Lefort and Castoriadis, also professors at EHESS, beginning in 1976 and
1980, respectively, and kept his distance from Pierre Manent, on the relative right
(Manent is perhaps best known for his introduction of Leo Strauss’s political
thought to the French scene).34
32 Michael Scott Christofferson, “An Antitotalitarian History of the French Revolution: Franc¸ois
Furet’s Penser la Re´volution franc¸aise in the Intellectual Politics of the Late 1970s,” French
Historical Studies 22 (1999): 557–611. The challenges to the German Sonderweg thesis came
from left and right: on the left, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichts-
schreibung (Berlin, 1980); on the right, Thomas Nipperdey, “Wehlers ‘Kaiserreich’: Eine kritische
Auseinandersetzung,” in Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsa¨tze zur neueren Ge-
schichte (Go¨ttingen, 1976).
33 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins” (n. 10 above), pp. 52–53.
34 For a rich discussion of Castoriadis, Lefort, and Gauchet (at EHESS since 1990), with em-
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In his own early work, Rosanvallon followed Furet’s general belief in the om-
nipresence of the totalitarian threat as well as Furet’s retrojection and elevation of
this danger as the treacherous essence of French democracy. Nevertheless, in the
name of his original democratizing aspiration, Rosanvallon hoped to avoid the
reduction of democracy to terror and to find a way to think about institutionalizing
it in some new form. From the beginning, Rosanvallon, like Lefort, his other
mentor, rejected Furet’s attempt to make purgation of revolution and terror from
politics the exclusive and self-sufficient focus of modern political theory and prac-
tice.35 In what follows, the question we pose to Rosanvallon’s historical oeuvre (as
opposed to his policy writings and activities)36 of the last two decades is whether
this rejection could survive and prosper alongside his larger affiliation with Furet’s
negativistic position.
To correct for the limitations of Furet’s historiographical approach, of course,
Rosanvallon first had to become a historian. He did so in the aftermath of a political
failure, faced with an intellectual quandary that amply prepared him to respond to
Furet’s historical work. Rosanvallon spent the middle years of the 1970s as a
member of the PS, fully engaged in the polemical and practical battle for suprem-
acy in the newly unified left. But events within the PS marginalized the autoges-
tionnaire movement, as Rocard, whom Rosanvallon supported in this period (for
example, by serving as a speechwriter), lost out to Mitterrand in a climactic strug-
gle. Mitterrand, more willing to accept PCF participation in the left-wing coalition
in the 1970s, assumed the French presidency in 1981, and Rosanvallon quit the
PS, confirming his decision to become more of an analyst and less of an actor.37
Rosanvallon concluded that behind the “tactical” failure of Rocard and the auto-
gestionnaire movement in the years of critique of totalitarianism lay a theoretical
failure—the failure to transcend negative opposition to communism and hierarchy
and to offer a more detailed and positive vision of politics. “The second left’s
intellectual capital remained too weak and did not suffice,” Rosanvallon recently
acknowledged. “Its positive contribution, beyond the criticism it offered, never
became developed enough.”38 For a thinker who in the 1970s always demanded
phasis on the way they have conceptualized the religious past, see Warren Breckman, “Democracy
between Disenchantment and Political Theology: French Post-Marxism and the Return of Reli-
gion,” New German Critique, no. 92 (Spring–Summer 2004).
35 See Claude Lefort, “Penser la re´volution dans la Re´volution franc¸aise,” Annales E.S.C. 35
(Mar.–Apr. 1980): 334–53 (available in English in Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political The-
ory, trans. David Macey [Minneapolis, 1988], chap. 5).
36 The most important of these activities was the Fondation Saint-Simon, on which Furet and
Rosanvallon collaborated from 1982 to 1997, and over which Rosanvallon then presided until he
closed it in 1999. More recently, he has inaugurated a new “think tank” called La Re´publique des
Ide´es. Rosanvallon’s policy writings otherwise unmentioned in the following have occurred in
two stages: one reacting to the stagflation and economic exhaustion of the 1970s, the other to the
bubble and yawning inequality of the late 1980s and 1990s. For the first phase, see Pierre Rosan-
vallon, La crise de l’E´ tat-providence (Paris, 1981), and Mise`re de l’e´conomie (Paris, 1983). For
the second, see Rosanvallon, La nouvelle question sociale (n. 2 above), and, with the economist
Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Le nouvel aˆge des ine´galite´s (Paris, 1996).
37 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins,” p. 60.
38 Rosanvallon, “Te´moignage” (n. 12 above), pp. 366–67.
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that the second left transcend the criticism of communism—indeed, claimed this
step as its central contribution—this admission is striking and crucial. Moreover,
this failure provided Rosanvallon a future project to complete, one that emerged
slowly over the years of the late 1970s as he became more associated with aca-
demic life and that continues to inform his scholarship today. If Furet’s Interpreting
the French Revolution epitomized the critique of totalitarianism in the 1970s, it is
because of the extent to which it rooted totalitarianism in the founding circum-
stances of the nation and left no self-evident democratic alternative to terror in its
history, especially not in the egalitarian radicalism of the revolutionary period. For
those, like Rosanvallon, who wanted the critique of totalitarianism to be a stepping-
stone to or an aspect of a larger vision of egalitarian democracy, Furet’s historical
argument left much more work to be done. By 1977, Rosanvallon later remem-
bered, he had already “formulated the program of . . . writing a new and compre-
hensive intellectual history of French democracy and of beginning a more general
theoretical reflection on democracy.”39 The quandaries of the present motivated a
return to the past, as the militant became, faute de mieux, a historian.
The shape of Rosanvallon’s project began to emerge clearly with Le capitalisme
utopique, his first work of historical scholarship, published in 1979. This book
illustrates both his debt to Furet and his intention to transcend this same mentor
through a novel intellectual strategy that would mark all of his work on French
democracy. In the introduction to the first edition of Le capitalisme utopique, Ro-
sanvallon began by acknowledging that “the recognition of the totalitarian phe-
nomenon has burst the framework of our political thought, causing our deepest
convictions to falter and obliging us to stop imagining the future as we have
customarily envisioned it. It is now no longer possible to retreat and to believe,
like the poet, that it is enough to reply to each collapse of evidence with a salvo
of the future.”40 To this rejection of totalitarianism then commonplace in French
thought, Rosanvallon added a new task: “immense work needs to be done now in
the definition of positive alternatives in order to keep our ambition to transform
society from being expunged along with our illusions.”41 This next step, Rosan-
vallon declared, involved the extension of the critique of totalitarianism to the
specter of totalitarianism present within the history of liberalism itself. “To rest
content with a radical criticism of Marx seems to me both insufficient and mis-
leading,” he continued. “In making Marx the single and definitive culprit of every-
39 Ibid., 365–66.
40 Pierre Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique: Critique de l’ide´ologie e´conomique (Paris,
1979), p. 5; Rosanvallon alluded here to the memorable line by the postwar French poet Rene´
Char: “A chaque effondrement des preuves / le poe`te re´pond par une salve d’avenir.” This book
has been reprinted twice, each time with a different title and a different preface. In addition, the
original conclusion has been dropped from both subsequent editions; see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le
libe´ralisme e´conomique: Histoire de l’ide´e de marche´ (Paris, 1989); and, most recently, with the
old title and the new subtitle, as Le capitalisme utopique: Histoire de l’ide´e de marche´ (Paris,
1999). The latter contains a new preface, entitled “Le marche´ et les trois utopies libe´rales.” Unless
noted otherwise, citations here are to the original (1979) edition.
41 Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique, p. 5. Rosanvallon specifically noted his allegiance to
Lefort’s critique of totalitarianism.
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thing objectionable in modern politics, one too easily exculpates all of modernity;
one risks the superficiality of forgetting that capitalism is another kind of delusion
in the modern world.” For this reason, Rosanvallon dedicated his book to making
clear the protototalitarian desire for monistic homogeneity and harmonious trans-
parency he saw to be latent in eighteenth-century liberal visions of the market. In
Rosanvallon’s eyes, “the liberal economic utopia of the eighteenth century and the
socialist political utopia of the nineteenth century turn out to be the two equal and
opposite faces of the same representation of society.”42 Rather than rejecting the
critique of totalitarianism, then, Rosanvallon attempted to extend it and to root it
deeply in the origins of liberalism itself (and not just democracy). As he put it
elsewhere in the text, “All of utopian liberalism’s intellectual foundations open
much more brutal paths. The refusal of the political, the utopia of a transparent
society, and the criticism of autonomous intermediary social structures: everything
is in place for . . . a totalitarian society.”43 Understanding this dark side of liberal
utopianism, he argued, would deepen contemporary understanding of the “reversal
of democracy into totalitarianism.”44 As a result, announced Rosanvallon, “It is
perhaps modernity itself that it is now necessary to interrogate and to bring before
the bar.”45 Reason and will, rationalism and voluntarism, economic harmony and
political unity: each pair emerged in Rosanvallon’s account as two faces of the
selfsame pathology.
Rosanvallon made this reading work by a heavy reliance on, and a political
reinterpretation of, the French anthropologist Louis Dumont’s outline of the his-
torical origins and distinctive shape of modernity. In various accounts of Indian
society meant to help isolate the novelty of the modern West, Dumont offered a
strict and stark contrast between holist and individualist societies, stressing the
contingency and rarity of the latter against the prevalence of the former in human
history, and marked the passage from hierarchy to equality—holism to individu-
alism—as the major turning point in Western (and human) history.46 For Dumont,
only Christianity made this transition possible, since it alone among human cultural
traditions had invented individualism, with modernity then finishing this process
and bringing individualism “into the world.”47 Discovered by his countrymen en
42 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
43 Ibid., p. 160.
44 Ibid., p. 158.
45 Ibid., p. 229.
46 See, esp., Louis Dumont, Homo hierarchicus: Essai sur le syste`me des castes (Paris, 1967).
In this line of thinking, Dumont revived—perhaps earlier than anyone else—Tocqueville’s
thought in France; see Nur Yalman, “De Tocqueville in India: An Essay on the Caste System,”
Man 4 (Mar. 1969): 123–31. In a book arguing for the Western contribution to the theory and
practice of caste, Nicholas Dirks remarks in a long discussion of Dumont that he “resurrected
colonial categories and arguments at a time when the West mistook their overdetermined reality
for an explanation of the East’s failure, and colonialism was either forgotten or consigned to Raj
nostalgia” (Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India [Prince-
ton, N.J., 2001], pp. 54–59, quotation at p. 57).
47 See Louis Dumont, “The Modern Conception of the Individual: Notes on Its Genesis,” Con-
tributions to Indian Sociology [The Hague] 8 (1965): 13–61; this essay appeared in France as
“La conception moderne de l’individu: Notes sur sa gene`se, en relation avec les conceptions de
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plein antitotalitarisme, Dumont also explained that the illiberal political regimes
of the twentieth century were futile but violent attempts at reversion to totalistic
holism, rebellions against (but still within) the modern individualistic universe.48
Rosanvallon welcomed this view and would, like Furet, adopt it straightforwardly
into his narrative.49 Most especially, Rosanvallon followed Dumont’s perception
that, contrary to appearances, Marx’s thought, though apparently holistic, counted
as a form of radical individualism, a transformation within the Western formation
rather than an alternative to it.
In his first work of history, Rosanvallon appropriated Dumont’s analysis as part
of his endeavor to understand the field of options at play in modern societies.50 He
located the birth of liberal economics in a far larger narrative of the rise of coun-
terpolitical thought in the early modern period, economic liberalism now emerging
in tandem with the revolutionary and voluntaristic counterpolitical vision that Furet
made so prominent in Interpreting the French Revolution. For Rosanvallon, a un-
animistic contractualism had been only one line of response, through Hobbes and
culminating in Rousseau, to the disorderly threat of human passions and conflicts
that Machiavelli had introduced to political philosophy. Moreover, the strictly po-
litical solution to Machiavellian disorder is one that, by the Enlightenment, seemed
increasingly unworkable. The “economic ideology,” Rosanvallon argued, arose as
a counterpolitical vision to the core, intending to harmonize human passions where
voluntaristic contractualism had failed. For this reason, Adam Smith emerged as
the major anti-Machiavellian of modern thought, his contribution far more in the
liquidation of politics via economics than in the establishment of a nascent disci-
pline: “In transposing Machiavelli onto the terrain of natural right in the state of
nature, Hobbes believed he had already mastered the vexing question of social
division on which Machiavelli insisted. The economic ideology that arose in the
eighteenth century, in erasing the distinction between civil society and the state of
nature which Hobbes required in order to exorcise Machiavelli, definitively severed
the connection with the author of The Prince. It is in this sense that the economic
la politique et de l’E´ tat, a` partir du treizie`me sie`cle,” Esprit, n.s., 14 (Feb. 1978): 18–54 (this
entire issue of Esprit is dedicated to Dumont’s thought). See also, Louis Dumont, “La gene`se
chre´tienne de l’individualisme moderne: Une vue modifie´e de nos origines,” Le De´bat 15 (Sept.–
Oct. 1981): 124–46. These and other essays by Dumont were later gathered as Essais sur
l’individualisme: Une perspective anthropologique sur l’ide´ologie moderne (Paris, 1983).
48 See Dumont’s perfectly timed text Homo aequalis, vol. 1, Gene`se et e´panouissement de
l’ide´ologie e´conomique (Paris, 1977); published slightly earlier in English as From Mandeville to
Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology (Chicago, 1977)—this book began as
Dumont’s Christian Gauss Lectures at Princeton University in 1973.
49 Franc¸ois Furet, “L’enfance de l’individu,” Le Nouvel Observateur 660 (July 10, 1977): 54–
55; and Pierre Rosanvallon, “Louis Dumont, le sacre de l’individu,” Libe´ration (Nov. 17, 1983).
For Rosanvallon, Dumont’s study of other cultures had allowed him to see the all-pervasive force
of individualism even in “totalitarians” apparently opposed to it, showing that “individualism and
statism work as a pair.” Dumont’s “Indian detour,” Rosanvallon concluded, “brings us in the final
analysis to our current, most pressing concerns” (Rosanvallon, “Louis Dumont, le sacre de
l’individu,” rpt. in Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 22 [1984]: 151).
50 See Marcel Gauchet, “De l’ave`nement de l’individu a` la de´couverte de la socie´te´,” Annales
E.S.C. 34 (May–June 1979): 451–63, for a contemporary commentary on the theoretical rela-
tionship between Dumont’s and Rosanvallon’s works.
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ideology, as a philosophy of radical emancipation, appears to be the summit of
modernity, in all of its blindness.”51 In this vein, Rosanvallon noted that by mar-
ginalizing Smith, Albert Hirschman’s celebrated thesis in The Passions and the
Interests that economic interests were called on to “tame,” “countervail,” or “har-
ness” the passions of political division somewhat understated the radicalism of
Smith’s “economic ideology.”52 The economic forum of commerce did not simply
counteract political passions; it transmuted them, suppressing diversity in the name
of harmony no less than contractualist voluntarism would. “The decisive turning
point,” Rosanvallon commented, “resided in the economic comprehension of poli-
tics, and of all social life. For Smith, the economy in itself resolves . . . the political
question.”53 For this reason, Smith fulfilled the deepest aim of the tradition of
contractual will formation precisely by parting ways with it and shifting it to the
terrain of market relations. Crucially, in spite of his intention to craft a new form
of liberalism, Rosanvallon viewed the legacy of eighteenth-century liberal utopi-
anism as also including nineteenth-century political liberalism, in which democ-
racy was seen to epitomize disorder: “Generally, it is into the political realm that
the eighteenth-century economic ideals were transferred. The utopia of the extinc-
tion of the political thereby came into its classic form. . . . If the bourgeoisie could
claim only with great difficulty that it had brought universal harmony into being,
it sought at least to make its own the notion of an end of politics and conflicts hic
et nunc. . . . When Guizot wrote On Democracy in France (1849), he began by
affirming that ‘today chaos is hidden in the guise of one word: democracy.’” Thus,
the harmonious utopia of Smith was extended by the political liberals of the nine-
teenth century. “The arithmetic of the passions, the harmony of the interests, uni-
versal fraternity: the same representation of man and society is at work in the
economy of the eighteenth and the polity of the nineteenth centuries. It is in this
sense that the economic ideology is at the heart of modernity.”54 As in Dumont’s
51 Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique, p. 61.
52 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism
before Its Triumph (Princeton, N.J., 1977).
53 Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique, pp. 60–61. For Rosanvallon, the primary manifesta-
tion of this ideology in France was the Physiocrats, whom he described as “radicalizing to the
extreme the reversal of the relationships between the economy and the polity, to the point of
entirely suppressing the concept of politics itself” (p. 50; emphasis in original).
54 Ibid., pp. 225, 226. In “Le marche´ et les trois utopies libe´rales,” the preface to the 1999
edition of Le capitalisme utopique, Rosanvallon restated his argument that political liberalism can
continue in the same antipolitical vein as economic liberalism. He describes political liberalism
as also a “utopia” but one “of a rule of law that could serve as a second substitute for the political
order of conflict and of negotiation. It constitutes the other side of the utopia of regulation that
underlies the modern concept of the market.” He furthermore writes of a single utopian liberal
“culture” that makes “the depersonalization of the world the condition of progress and of liberty”
and that “permits speaking of liberalism in the singular. Among Locke’s Letters on Toleration,
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, and Benjamin Constant’s
Principles of Politics a single project of emancipation is at work” (Le capitalisme utopique [1999
ed.], pp. ix–x). Rosanvallon also devoted a chapter of his book (originally his thesis), Le moment
Guizot, to “the order of reason” in Guizot’s thought. By contrast, Gauchet suggested, as early as
1980 in an implicit restriction of the significance of Rosanvallon’s argument, that the priority of
political liberalism over economic liberalism allowed the rejection of the fiction of economic
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work, Rosanvallon’s revisionist account culminated in the suggestion that Karl
Marx had been, on some profound level, a follower of Smith since Marx never
left the liberal, individualist horizon Smith had introduced—he merely substituted
natural harmony among men for Smith’s natural harmony among interests. Marx’s
essentially harmonious and transparent society after the leap to communism, pre-
supposing the violent suppression of disunity and difference, turned out to be
Smithian to the core.55
Rosanvallon’s arguments in Le capitalisme utopique illuminate the chain of
intellectual associations he forged at this decisive moment of his transition from
militant to historian. While one should not reduce Le capitalisme utopique to the
politics of a particular moment, it clearly served a political end in its time, a fact
Rosanvallon would gladly accept in light of his methodological insistence through-
out his career on the promise of a present-minded (if not presentist) historiogra-
phy.56 Evidently, Rosanvallon’s account in 1979 of both voluntarism and ration-
alism as latently totalitarian (because they both quashed the political) stems directly
from his engagement with Lefort as well as with Furet. But it does so in a highly
interesting and, arguably, still negative way. It clears the political ground of an
apparent alternative to voluntaristic democracy—economic liberalism and even
some forms of political liberalism—without explaining what positive vision of
politics might respond to the difficulties inherent in both. In this regard, Rosan-
harmony without the rejection of political liberalism; see Marcel Gauchet, “Benjamin Constant:
L’illusion lucide du libe´ralisme,” in De la liberte´ chez les modernes: Ecrits politiques, by Ben-
jamin Constant, ed. Marcel Gauchet (Paris, 1980), pp. 64–66.
55 See Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique, chap. 8.
56 Although a discussion of Rosanvallon’s historical methodology is beyond the scope of this
essay, it is worth noting that Rosanvallon shares in the recent French critique of Quentin Skinner
for having, in his early work, reduced the past to an irrelevancy as if antiquarianism were the
only alternative to the belief in perennial issues in philosophy. Skinner “wished, or was obliged,”
Rosanvallon concludes, “to limit his role to that of a Cambridge professor,” foreclosing the pros-
pect that the historian’s work can enjoy a communion with present quandaries and even contribute
to their solution (Rosanvallon, cited in Jeremy Jennings, “‘Le retour des e´migre´s’? The Study of
the History of Political Ideas in Contemporary France,” in Castiglione and Hampsher-Monk, eds.
[n. 13 above], pp. 226–27). Such accusations, which are understandable in light of some state-
ments in Skinner’s early methodological writings, have been multiplied in recent years on the
French scene: see Yves-Charles Zarka, “L’interpre´tation entre passe´ et pre´sent,” Le De´bat 96
(Sept. 1997): 108–14; and Quentin Skinner, “Les concepts et l’histoire,” Le De´bat 96 (Sept.–
Oct. 1997): 115–21. That Skinner has himself recently attempted to avoid his early “antiquari-
anism” is suggested by his own recent inaugural lecture, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge,
1998). For Rosanvallon’s methodology, see Rosanvallon, “Towards a Philosophical History of the
Political” (n. 13 above), which is an enriched version of Pierre Rosanvallon, “Pour une histoire
conceptuelle du politique (note du travail),” Revue de synthe`se 1–2 (1996): 93–105. Rosanvallon’s
previous methodological comments include “Faire l’histoire du politique: Entretien avec Pierre
Rosanvallon,” Esprit 209 (Feb. 1995): 25–42; and “Le politique,” in Une E´ cole pour les sciences
sociales: De la VIe section a` l’E´ cole des Hautes E´ tudes en Sciences Sociales, ed. Jacques Revel
and Nathan Wachtel (Paris, 1996). Rosanvallon, along with some EHESS colleagues, also founded
a journal of political thought called La Pense´e politique, which ran for a few years in the mid-
1990s; for his contribution to the premier issue, see Pierre Rosanvallon, “Histoire du mot ‘de´-
mocratie’ a` l’e´poque moderne,” La Pense´e politique 1 (Apr. 1993): 11–29; this essay has been
translated as “The History of the Word ‘Democracy’ in France,” trans. Philip J. Costopoulous,
Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 140–54.
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vallon’s first historical venture retrojects the quandary of the second left into the
very origins of modernity. In a sense, Le capitalisme utopique attempts to rob
liberalism of legitimacy on the same grounds on which the critique of totalitari-
anism had invalidated voluntarist democracy. But in extending the negative verdict
to rationalist liberalism, it remained, like the second left, negativistic, clearer about
what it is against than about what it is for. And it avoided one potential cure for
modernity that Furet often endorsed—liberalism—only by worsening the original
disease.
In this manner, Rosanvallon both accepted the premises of the critique of total-
itarianism and attempted to broaden and alter its target. His gambit demonstrates
his belief in the centrality of the critique of totalitarianism and in its amenability
to a variety of different intellectual outcomes and political ends. The critique of
totalitarianism was so fundamental—and the specter of totalitarianism loomed so
large—that it could unveil the latent pathologies of liberal capitalism just as it had
exposed those of democratic voluntarism. Taken to its full analytical and political
conclusions, it undermined the fiction of a fully harmonious market capitalism just
as it had already successfully smashed the delusions of statist communism. With
the repudiation of the two equated extremes, Rosanvallon intended to suggest some
reconciliation of individualism with solidarity, market and state, as the only hope
for a free society after the discredited errors of capitalism and communism alike.
In his conclusion to Le capitalisme utopique, Rosanvallon accordingly rejected the
illusion that the rule of law and the rights of man provide a sufficient content for
liberalism and spoke of “a political theory simultaneously realistic and revolution-
ary” as “a project critical to the future of democracy.”57 That such a surprising
program could emerge from the critique of totalitarianism, it bears insisting,
worked only by rooting the disease deep in modernity itself. Moreover, it found a
way to hope about modern politics only by compounding, rather than marginal-
izing, the terror Furet had associated with it.
Rosanvallon, like other “neoliberal” intellectuals at the time, presented his proj-
ect with great confidence. In an important article published at just this moment in
an early issue of Le De´bat, Rosanvallon, participating in a forum on the vacuum
that was left in French intellectual life by Jean-Paul Sartre’s death, argued that the
time had come for a definitive break with the Marxism that had hitherto provided
the theoretical underpinnings of the French left.58 Boldly likening his revival of
Locke and Tocqueville to the medieval recovery of the Aristotelian corpus, Ro-
sanvallon repeated his themes from the debates of the 1970s—the departure from
totalitarianism, the renewal of democracy, surpassing the alternative between sta-
tism and privatism.59 His brash suggestion to “forget the old fashions,” however,
57 Rosanvallon, Le capitalisme utopique, p. 230.
58 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Oublier les modes,” Le De´bat 4 (Sept. 1980): 80: “It has seemed in-
creasingly more productive to many, including myself, to move directly beyond Marxism, in order
to save time.”
59 Ibid., p. 81. Rosanvallon’s exaggerated sense of the theoretical importance of “classic” (i.e.,
nineteenth-century) texts is what led him to his work on Guizot, which he undertook as part of
the larger enterprise—in Rosanvallon’s words, “a program of rehabilitating the classics and of
rereading the tradition”—carried out at the time by those associated with the Centre Raymond
Aron (Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins” [n. 10 above], pp. 53–54). Compare Furet’s call for
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concealed the difficulty of the intellectual enterprise he had set himself. Rosan-
vallon’s triangulation, put differently, posed but did not resolve the fundamental
problem of just how to imagine a modern society committed to freedom and equal-
ity that would avoid the temptation of totalitarian unity that Rosanvallon read in
the theoretical origins of both liberalism and democracy. As he testified in 2000,
this intellectual quandary compelled him to enter “a long period of intellectual
correction [un grand cycle de rattrapage intellectuel] . . . from which I am only
now emerging.”60 The question posed in what follows is whether Rosanvallon’s
subsequent turn to French history succeeded in providing the proper terrain for the
completion of his daring but difficult enterprise of discovering sources in the past
for political solidarity compatible with the need for social pluralism—sources that
would allow the polity to avoid a complacent neoliberal sequel to the dangerous
totalitarianism of the past. In other words, it asks whether Rosanvallon’s history
of democracy in France was able to fulfill the unrealized intention of the second
left.
II. DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE
Rosanvallon’s recently completed trilogy on the history of democracy in France
extended his political project to an ambitious assessment of French history from
1789 to the present. It makes clear his devotion to liberal democracy as the telos
of modern politics, while also highlighting the pathologies to which both liberalism
and democracy in his view are prone. The goal throughout, in light of these pa-
thologies, is to pursue a form of liberal democracy that can inoculate itself against
its own potential diseases. He owes this paradigm for understanding the past to
Furet, but he attempts to renovate it substantially. Just as his argument in Le ca-
pitalisme utopique placed voluntarist democracy and rationalist liberalism on the
same protototalitarian footing, Rosanvallon’s presentation of the history of de-
mocracy in France extends Furet’s pathogenic analysis of the French past, espe-
cially the French Revolution and its legacy, to include an indictment of rationalist
liberalism as well as of political voluntarism.61 In so doing, Rosanvallon’s historical
“the return to the good authors of the nineteenth century” in the first issue of Le De´bat: Franc¸ois
Furet, “E´ ditorial: Le XIXe sie`cle et l’intelligence du politique,” Le De´bat 1 (May 1980): 125. For
similar statements, see Gauchet’s revival of Benjamin Constant the same year: “Benjamin Con-
stant,” esp. pp. 19–23. In addition to penning his thesis on Guizot, Rosanvallon also prepared an
edition of a previously unknown piece of Guizot—“De la souverainete´,” written between 1821
and 1823—that he discovered in the National Archives in Paris: it appears as an appendix in
Franc¸ois Guizot, Histoire de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l’Empire romain jusqu’a`
la Re´volution franc¸aise; suivie de Philosophie politique de la souverainete´, ed. Pierre Rosanvallon
(Paris, 1985).
60 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins,” pp. 54–55.
61 Or, as he recently put it, “The fundamental contradiction in French political culture: the
encounter between political rationalism and popular sovereignty” (Pierre Rosanvallon, “Political
Rationalism and Democracy in France in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Philosophy
and Social Criticism 28 [Nov. 2002]: 687). Although Rosanvallon has disavowed an overt con-
nection between his work in the “history of political ideas in the classical sense of the term”
(referring to Le capitalisme utopique and Le moment Guizot) and his trilogy on democracy in
France, this review will show the important relationship between these works (Rosanvallon, “Sur
quelques chemins,” p. 55).
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scholarship rejects the neoliberal alternative that Furet’s paradigm implicitly cham-
pions. For Rosanvallon, the “normalization” of French democracy would require
the surpassing of both rationalist liberalism and political voluntarism. Furthermore,
while for Furet the normalization of French democracy occurred by way of a
compromise among France’s elites during the consolidation of the Third Republic
in the 1870s, Rosanvallon views normalization as having occurred through extra-
parliamentary developments in what he dubs the “silent revolution” of the 1890s.
The pages that follow focus on these two features of Rosanvallon’s history of
democracy in France in order to assess the fecundity of his attempt to revise Furet’s
revisionism from within.
Rosanvallon’s history of French democracy is organized around the conceptual
tension between liberalism and democracy, which he plots as a fundamental “du-
ality” internal to the advent of “political modernity.” It is “internal” because both
liberalism and democracy stem from “the modern idea of emancipation,” which,
as he put it in his recent Lec¸on inaugurale, “refers to a desire for individual au-
tonomy (with law as the privileged vector) at the same time as to a project of
participation in the exercise of social power (that therefore puts politics in the
place of authority [qui met la politique au poste du commandement]).”62 Each
volume of his trilogy plots in relation to this duality a particular aspect of what
Rosanvallon calls the “triple experience” of democracy in France: the experience
of individualism and political equality, the empowerment of the collective, and the
reconciliation of the sovereignty of the people to representative government.63
Rosanvallon’s conviction, inspired by Dumont, that the advent of the individual
is the single most distinctive characteristic of modernity as a whole led Rosanvallon
to narrate the French experience of individualism and political equality in volume
1 of his trilogy, Le sacre du citoyen. He analyzes this broad theme through the
lens of the historical emergence of universal suffrage in France, which he locates
in the “history of a double transition: from simple consent to self-government, on
the one hand; from the people figured as a body to the autonomous individual, on
the other. This history is exemplary in the sense that it is at the heart of the double
movement of secularization (the self-institution of the political and of the social)
and of individualization (the advent of the individual as organizing category of the
social) that accompanies the advent of modernity” (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 34).
Suffrage acquires the decisive place it holds in Rosanvallon’s historical vision
because it is the political and legal codification of the phenomenon that, following
Dumont, he considers the defining feature of modernity. The “sacre de l’individu”
that Rosanvallon praised Dumont for uncovering led naturally to the project of
Rosanvallon’s own Le sacre du citoyen.
Volume 2, Le peuple introuvable, examines the empowerment of the collective,
or the problem of politically embodying the people. The theoretical inspiration
62 Rosanvallon, Chaire d’histoire moderne et contemporaine du politique (n. 14 above), p. 13
(for an almost identical formulation, see La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 22). Note that the bracketed
phrase from the original French is the subtitle of Rosanvallon’s early book L’aˆge de l’autogestion
(n. 18 above)—suggesting the long-term continuity in his career.
63 Rosanvallon, “Sur quelques chemins,” pp. 57–58.
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behind Le peuple introuvable is Lefort, who posed the problem of the embodiment
of political power in democracy.64 According to Rosanvallon, this problem arises
from the fact that “the contradiction between the nature of democratic society (the
society without bodies) and the presuppositions of democratic politics (the con-
stitution of a represented fictive person) leads to a permanent search for identity
that cannot be satisfied” (Le peuple introuvable, p. 18). This ongoing crisis of
representation, he asserts, is unavoidable because representation is founded on a
“necessary fiction. This fiction is in effect a condition for being able to integrate
the full diversity of the social into the unity of the political body” (Le peuple
introuvable, p. 41 n. 1). Rosanvallon thus considered the problem of imagining
the people, which Furet had called the inevitable cause of revolutionary terror, to
be a permanent undertaking. In modern democracies there is, for Rosanvallon, an
enduring and unavoidable duality between the politically unified “one” and the
social “many,” and the history of democracy in France was conceptually destined
to oscillate between a singular embodiment of the general will and the plural
embodiments of particular wills, without achieving a reconciliation.
The third lens through which Rosanvallon examines democracy in France is the
problem of reconciling the sovereignty of the people to representative government,
which forms the subject of La de´mocratie inacheve´e. Following the American and
French Revolutions, he explains, a fundamental divide emerged between under-
standing the representative system as “a simple technical artifice resulting from a
purely practical constraint (organizing power in a society of large size)” and un-
derstanding it as “a positive philosophical vision with its own virtues [and] as an
original and specific political form.” Significantly, “these two approaches are con-
tradictory insofar as representative government is understood, in the first case, as
an equivalent to democracy, while it constitutes, in the second, a surpassing of
democracy” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 12). In Rosanvallon’s telling, though,
this difference did not resolve into two opposed alternatives but led into a con-
ceptual confusion, one that stemmed from a deeper confusion about the notion of
sovereignty: Is the sovereignty of the people always active, or is it exercised only
in extraordinary circumstances? Is it an active principle or, rather, a form of au-
thorization? The history of democracy in France, for Rosanvallon, has been marked
by a failure to clarify these conceptual questions.
Doubling the French Pathology
The French Revolution stands for Rosanvallon as the founding pathological mo-
ment whose legacy democracy in France has had to overcome. Thus, it receives
serious treatment in each volume of his trilogy. As he tells it, 1789 inaugurated
both a democratic and a liberal revolution in France. All modern liberal democ-
64 Lefort had politicized the theme of the body (it had figured prominently in Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology), a theme then elaborated in a celebrated article by Marcel Gauchet, “Des
deux corps du roi au pouvoir sans corps: Christianisme et politique I et II,” Le De´bat 14 (July–
Aug. 1981): 133–57; 15 (Sept.–Oct. 1981): 147–68. According to this view, democratic societies
face like none before the problem of embodying power because they have lost the mortal body
of the king and always face the “totalitarian” temptation of fictive unity.
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racies must undergo democratic and liberal revolutions, he argues, and France’s
“exceptionalism” can be explained in no small part by these two revolutions’ si-
multaneous occurrence there in 1789.65 From that moment on, France was con-
demned to oscillate “between the power of the street and a rationalist and aristo-
cratic liberalism” (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 171).
Rosanvallon’s analysis of the Revolution in his trilogy follows from his argu-
ment in Le capitalisme utopique that both political voluntarism and rationalist
liberalism are potentially protototalitarian—that both are poisoned sources for
modern democracy. Historiographically, he follows and amends Furet’s famous
interpretation of the Revolution and the Terror, which reduced the drive to terror
to political voluntarism, or what Keith Michael Baker has dubbed the “discourse
of political will.”66 While Rosanvallon largely follows Furet’s analysis of the Terror
itself, he breaks with Furet by implicating rationalist liberalism in the Revolution’s
full set of pathologies. Whereas Furet, in his portraits both of the Terror and of a
longer-term “Revolutionary France,” blames voluntarist democracy and its peri-
odic reemergence in the nineteenth century for the failure of French political cul-
ture to “normalize,” Rosanvallon seeks to indict as well the rationalist liberal al-
ternative. Rosanvallon’s is thus a very different model from that offered by Furet
and his most orthodox followers in that it implicitly rejects neoliberalism as a
superior alternative to democratic voluntarism. Historically, both were damaged
goods in their pure forms.
In Rosanvallon’s narrative of the Revolution, the competing paradigms of vol-
untarist democracy and rationalist liberalism came into conflict with each other
virtually from day one. One of the most important sites of this conflict was the
fundamental but explosive question of who would be included as a citizen and
who would not. Would the citizenry be defined in radically democratic terms, or,
following the most prominent eighteenth-century reformers, would it be limited to
an enlightened elite?67 He begins with an attempt to explain the revolutionaries’
startling proclamation of near universal male suffrage in August 1792 and in the
Constitution of 1793—and thus the triumph of democratic voluntarism over elitist,
rationalist liberalism. Following closely in the footsteps of Furet, Rosanvallon first
analyzes what he calls the “imperative of inclusion” and attributes the drive to two
principal developments: the transfer of sovereignty from the king to the people,
65 On Rosanvallon’s account, there are three major moments in the emergence of the modern
Western state: the moment of political secularization (from which follows the sovereign state),
the liberal moment, and the democratic moment. “French specificity,” he argues, resulted from
an early moment of political secularization following the wars of religion in France, and a late
liberal moment that occurred simultaneously with the democratic moment during the French
Revolution. England is offered as the example of a nation in which these revolutions occurred
separately (Pierre Rosanvallon, L’E´ tat en France de 1789 a` nos jours [Paris, 1990], pp. 98, 125,
272–75).
66 See Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (n. 1 above); and Keith Michael Baker, In-
venting the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century
(Cambridge, 1990).
67 Rosanvallon describes the two-tier voting systems established in the Constitutions of 1791
and 1795 and the lists of “notables” in the Constitution of 1800 as attempts to fuse popular
sovereignty and elite rule (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 184–95).
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and a new representation of society in 1789 that integrated “the people” en bloc.
The former created a regime of politically equal individuals because there was a
“collective entry into sovereignty” (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 59). That is, the people
as a single entity reoccupied the absolutist power as an undifferentiated collective
subject, each member of which possessed that power equally. The new represen-
tation of society in 1789 resulted from the preeminent role played by the attack
on privilege in the Revolution’s early days—because the Old Regime had been
based on exclusion and differentiation, the new one would include everyone on
equal terms—and likewise demanded that everyone possess an equal share in the
newly acquired sovereignty. As a result of these two factors, suffrage and elections
were envisioned as acts of participation in sovereignty rather than as an “English”-
style representation of interests, a fateful step that would indelibly mark French
history. French specificity, Rosanvallon writes in the closing pages of Le sacre du
citoyen, proceeded directly from the Revolution’s conception of “suffrage-as-be-
longing.” French specificity “is based on the certainty that the general interest,
inasmuch as it embodies the ‘truth’ of society, cannot be deduced from particular
interests. . . . The right to vote in France does not therefore proceed from the con-
struction of the general interest: it is essentially akin to a symbolics of social
belonging and to a form of the collective reappropriation of the ancient royal
power” (p. 452).68 The revolutionaries, however, did not at first establish universal
suffrage, a fact that might seem to speak against Rosanvallon’s conceptually de-
termined historical narrative. Rosanvallon ascribes the relative conservatism of
suffrage law at the beginning of the Revolution, notably, the categories of “active”
and “passive” citizens, to what he calls “anthropological” conservatism, or elitist
and exclusionary ideas about just who was considered “autonomous” or “indepen-
dent” (pp. 41–42). But events conspired to radicalize the definition of citizenship
beyond at least some of the boundaries fixed by the revolutionaries’ limited an-
thropological horizons (transients and domestics were still denied the franchise).
Scores of citizen-soldiers and national guardsmen originally designated as passive
citizens were manifestly active in defending the nation and, as a result, were sub-
sequently included in revisions to voting requirements enacted in 1792 and 1793
(pp. 91–101).
The temporary dominance of voluntarism in the Revolution did not prevent at
least one figure from realizing, and attempting (like Rosanvallon himself later) to
think through, France’s ultimate need to avoid the pitfalls of both voluntarism and
rationalism. This figure is Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicholas de Caritat, the Marquis
de Condorcet. In Le sacre du citoyen, Rosanvallon provides a rich discussion of
Condorcet’s search for formal voting procedures to reduce “the tension between
liberalism and democracy” (p. 175). Condorcet is presented here as something of
a precursor to Guizot, as posing similar, fundamental questions about the relation-
68 Rosanvallon argues that before the Revolution there was no idea of the people as collective
sovereign and that the idea of the sovereignty of the people employed in France against absolutism
following the Wars of Religion by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, Claude Joly, Pierre Jurieu, and
Franc¸ois Hotman was closer to the medieval notion of consent or authorization than to the modern
concept of self-government (ibid., pp. 22–30).
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ship between democracy and rationalist liberalism (although, to be sure, Condor-
cet’s procedural solution was infinitely less hostile to democracy than the restrictive
voting requirements Guizot later advocated). Why did Condorcet’s attempts fail?
Here Rosanvallon again turns to the Furetian answer: because of the voluntarist
basis of the revolutionary social contract, because will proved to be stronger than
rationalism at this stage of the Revolution. As “circumstances”—Rosanvallon is
not clear here if he means the war, although his choice of this term of art does not
seem accidental and would represent a significant gesture away from Furet’s in-
terpretation and toward the the`se de circonstances—pushed the relationship be-
tween friend and enemy to the center of France’s politics, the Montagnards and
Robespierre “substituted” virtue for reason and claimed that virtue inheres natu-
rally in the people and need only be left to emerge of its own accord. Thus, writes
Rosanvallon, “the coincidence of number and reason that Condorcet was trying to
find through scholarly procedures spontaneously resulted, for the Montagnards,
from the free expression of the virtuous people” (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 176–
77). For Rosanvallon, in what amounts to a Furetian interpretation of the Terror,
this substitution of virtue for reason—and the presumed isomorphism between
virtue and the general will—perpetuated and accelerated a dynamic by which the
people could define itself only by defining its enemies, and by pursuing them.
After Thermidor, France’s elites rejected the gesture toward democracy made by
Condorcet and instead turned to exclusionary ideas of capacity to check voluntarist
democracy, setting France on its path toward Guizot and the Doctrinaires.69 Thus,
after the explosion of terroristic democracy in the Revolution, the elites of sub-
sequent regimes sought to check the people through restrictive suffrage laws in
the name of political rationalism. And they typically did so through the appeal to
elites as a necessary liberal counterbalance to democratic empowerment of the
people.
Rosanvallon’s analysis of voluntarism and rationalism as modernity’s twin pa-
thologies, and of their secret collusion in demanding the homogeneity of a post-
political society, is perhaps the most determinative in regard to the problem of
political embodiment. With the advent of the people as the single, undifferentiated
sovereign in the Revolution, the question naturally arose of just how the people,
with all its sociological complexity and differentiation, would be politically em-
bodied. Would it be a singular body? Or an ensemble of different individuals and
groups? In the Revolution, Rosanvallon argues, clearly adopting one of Furet’s
fundamental claims about the period from 1789 to 1793, a radical disjuncture arose
between the political and the social. The people was established as a singular
69 For Rosanvallon, the Thermidorians’ ideas about capacity were anticipated by the Physiocrat
Paul Pierre Le Mercier de la Rivie`re’s L’heureuse nation of 1792, a text that he marks as charting
a new course: “Le Mercier de la Rivie`re thus paves the way for the citoyen capacitaire of the
nineteenth century. The idea will begin to form in the policies of the Year III, when certain
conventionnels propose to subordinate the right to vote to the ability to read and write; it will
continue to develop in the Year VIII, when Roederer and Sieye`s will want to put in place lists of
notables. But it will find its true expression only under the Restoration, when Guizot and the
Doctrinaires forge the theory of the citoyen capacitaire, consistent with the basic requisites of
French political rationalism” (ibid., p. 180).
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political subject, “a people-principle. . . . Principle and promise at once, it sym-
bolizes the constitution of society in a bloc by the presence of its name alone and
serves to universalize the national entity. It reflects the true nature of the social
bond: it refers to a political proposition before it is a sociological fact” (Le peuple
introuvable, p. 31). The people, however, was a sociological fact that proved to
be far less unitary than the fiction of the people-principle implied. A tension nat-
urally resulted, one that caused great violence in the Revolution and went on to
structure the history of democracy in France. This fundamental conflict between
the people as a legitimating principle and the people as a social reality is in part,
we will see, what led Rosanvallon to turn to Guizot to rethink democratic politics
in the present.
As Rosanvallon tells it, the specific historical genesis of this problem in the
Revolution stemmed from the predicament that “the passage from a society of
corporations to a society of individuals renders society less representable” (Le
peuple introuvable, p. 31). The society of equal and qualitatively fungible individ-
uals, represented solely as a singular bloc transcending the myriad particularities
and complex differentiation of civil society, led to an abstract and homogeneous
notion of the people that, in turn, could be realized only by pitting political vol-
untarism against sociological reality. In their common hostility to intermediate or
“partial” associations, rationalist individualism and voluntarist holism conspired,
and the result was radical antipluralism. In pointing to the passage from a society
of corporations to one of individuals as a fundamental cause of the Revolution’s
antipluralism, Rosanvallon’s normative and historical projects intersect in a re-
vealing fashion. For Rosanvallon, intermediary bodies play an essential role in
representing a society of individuals, in halting an overly abstract, and thus anti-
pluralist and potentially terroristic, figuration of the people. The Revolution, how-
ever, “declared war against intermediary bodies” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
p. 201), and, he adds elsewhere, “the origins of one very specific trait of French
political culture is located there.”70 Rosanvallon thus assigns great historical sig-
nificance to the crushing of intermediary bodies carried out under the two succes-
sive sets of Le Chapelier laws.71 In the Revolution, for Rosanvallon, the social was
never able to escape the violent distortions of political voluntarism (a collectivist
voluntarism in covert cooperation with individualist rationalism). As a result,
viewed through the lens of political embodiment in Le peuple introuvable, the
Revolution represents all but pure pathology.
The French Revolution poisoned the well of French democracy for Rosanvallon
in a third way as well, in the difficult confrontation of the sovereignty of the people
and representative government. From 1789 on, he explains, there was conceptual
70 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Corporations et corps interme´diaires,” Le De´bat 57 (Nov–Dec. 1989):
191.
71 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 190–91; Le peuple introuvable, p. 249; La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 202;
and L’E´ tat en France, pp. 95–96. This is, of course, a Tocquevillian consideration, hence Rosan-
vallon’s long-term search in Tocqueville’s tracks for intermediate bodies or partial associations
that can functionally replace the lost feudal orders and thus avoid the stark contrast between
individual and society. See, e.g., Rosanvallon, “Corporations et corps interme´diaires,” pp. 190–
94, and see n. 104 below on syndicalism.
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confusion over just what sovereignty and democracy were to mean in the new
France, and the Revolution, in his story, traveled from de´mocratie repre´sente´e to
de´mocratie repre´sentative to terror and dictatorship. In 1790–91, the ideal of de´-
mocratie repre´sente´e—that is, democracy enacted through representatives who
were to remain tied to the people—prevailed. Three principal means were pro-
posed to achieve this ideal: surveillance of the representatives by the people,
sanction of laws by the people through a referendum-like process, and what Ro-
sanvallon calls the separation of the “constitutive moment” from “ordinary gov-
ernance” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 43–52).72 The fall of the monarchy in the
summer of 1792 provoked a new crisis and a whole new round of reflection on
the nature of popular sovereignty; in the resultant constitutional discussion of 1793,
the term “representative democracy” assumed a central place. Here, Rosanvallon
once again pays great attention to Condorcet’s thinking, highlighting his proposed
constitution. “Condorcet’s objective,” Rosanvallon explains, “was to design a form
of representative government that did not lead to limiting or restraining the sov-
ereignty of the people” but would instead “pluraliz[e] the modalities for the ex-
ercise of the sovereignty of the people in order to transform the relationship of
democracy to representative government into a positive-sum game” (pp. 59–60).
Condorcet sought to institutionalize social complexity and plural modes of rep-
resentation, which “enables interpreting liberalism in a new way, as a form of
democracy, paving the way for a complex sovereignty. He outlines a sort of ‘liberal
Rousseauism,’ the diversity of temporalities of democracy and the plurality of
modes of expression becoming the double condition of a more active sovereignty”
(pp. 60–61). For Condorcet, in the end, the general will does not exist anterior to
political activity, nor does it come into existence through representation as in the
thought of Emmanuel-Joseph Sieye`s, but it results from “a continuous process of
interaction and of reflection between the people and the representatives” (p. 62).73
Condorcet figures here as proposing the Revolution’s tragically missed oppor-
tunity, as his plan was rejected due to the persistence of monistic ideas about
sovereignty. Rosanvallon’s argument on this issue is extremely interesting because
72 This last option was outlined most clearly by Jacques-Pierre Brissot in 1791, and Rosanvallon
provides a fascinating discussion of Brissot’s political thought. “Brissot,” argues Rosanvallon,
“redefines the framework of the revolutionary problem. He ceases to understand it in purely
procedural terms (the forms of direct intervention by the people counterbalancing the represen-
tative ‘detour’) and resituates it in a general economy of political time. Ordinary politics (legis-
lative and executive) for him works as delegated sovereignty, while extraordinary politics (con-
stitutional) is more directly based on popular will. . . . In this pioneering way, Brissot points to
the importance of the relationship between political power and time” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
pp. 48–49). Rosanvallon adds that Brissot “thus paves the way for theories of democracy that
have been described, two centuries later, as ‘dualist,’” referring to Bruce Ackerman’s celebrated
We the People, 2 vols. (so far) (Cambridge, Mass., 1991–).
73 Rosanvallon’s description of Condorcet’s ideas here echoes his own recent normative hope
to develop a “complex” or “pluralized” notion of sovereignty in which popular will would be
expressed and represented in a range of socially grounded forms so that “democracy can . . . be
fully and absolutely liberal” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 404, 408). Compare Rosanvallon’s
Chaire d’histoire moderne et contemporaine du politique (n. 14 above), which lays out his plans
for future scholarship.
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he asserts that both under the Terror and during Thermidor sovereignty was “con-
fiscated,” albeit in drastically different ways. The Montagnards established the
people as the sole site of sovereignty, but then reduced the people to a moral
principle that only Robespierre himself could embody. Rosanvallon quotes Furet’s
view that Robespierre “mythically reconciled direct democracy and the represen-
tative principle” in his own person.74 The Thermidorians also usurped sovereignty,
but they did so through an openly elitist regime, “by small groups of notables
proclaiming themselves guardians of rights and of property.” For Rosanvallon, the
Terror and Thermidor stand in the historical record as the two poles of terroristic
democracy and elitist liberalism, “two moments that thereby constitute two nascent
figures of French political pathology” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 66). Rosan-
vallon’s discussion here highlights his revision of the Furet paradigm, as Furet had
described Thermidor as the return of social interests on the French scene and thus
a temporary normalization of political discourse after the hallucinatory politics of
1789–94. In Rosanvallon’s account, Thermidor instead established the opposite
and equally dangerous extreme of French political life: elitist, rationalist liberalism.
Taken as a whole, Rosanvallon’s interpretation of the Revolution defines the
revolutionary experience as fatally marked by the pathologies of both democratic
voluntarism and rationalist liberalism. On the one hand, Rosanvallon follows the
Furetian interpretation of the Revolution as seeking to impose a unitary political
will on the heterogeneous social body. But, on the other hand, Rosanvallon also
mobilizes his argument from Le capitalisme utopique to extend Furet’s pathogenic
reading of the Revolution to include rationalist liberalism as also latently antipo-
litical. In this, there is a clear continuation of Rosanvallon’s attempt to extend the
antitotalitarian paradigm of Furet’s Interpreting the French Revolution. That is not
to say, however, that for Rosanvallon there were no alternative forms of thinking
the political during the Revolution. Rosanvallon sees Condorcet in particular as a
vital resource for a creative rethinking of the relationship between liberalism and
democracy. Nonetheless, democracy and liberalism remained at loggerheads in the
Revolution, and France was condemned to a tortuous path through the nineteenth
century. Rosanvallon’s final analysis in La de´mocratie inacheve´e of the Thermi-
dorian moment encapsulates his broader stance: “The Thermidorians remained
prisoners of this contradiction between two universes, democratic and liberal[;]
because they failed to think through the problem, they proved to be incapable of
surpassing this contradiction” (p. 91).75
74 Furet, Penser la Re´volution franc¸aise, p. 86, quoted in Rosanvallon, La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
p. 79.
75 Before France embarked on its nineteenth-century road of radicalizations, however, Napole´on
Bonaparte was to attempt a reconciliation of democracy and rationalism—what Rosanvallon has
called the “first organized form that the relationship between the Government of Reason and the
sovereignty of the people would take” (“Political Rationalism and Democracy in France” [n. 61
above], p. 697). Rosanvallon insists, pace Constant and Guizot, that Bonapartism was not a “vulgar
pathology of popular sovereignty” but an “alloy of administrative rationalism and of popular
legitimization . . . perfectly coherent with the ideals of the Enlightenment and the Revolution.
[Bonapartism] offers in its way an answer to the tension between le nombre and la raison” and
needs to be understood as “a stage in the history of French democracy” (Le sacre du citoyen,
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The Thermidorians’ inability to surpass the “contradiction” between democracy
and liberalism and their decision to concentrate sovereignty in the hands of a small
elite were repeated in the two post-Napoleonic constitutional monarchies, to which
Rosanvallon devotes great attention in his oeuvre. He first explored the time period
in his thesis, Le moment Guizot, later penned a study of the constitutions of 1814
and 1830 entitled La monarchie impossible, and then assigned Guizot and the
Doctrinaires pivotal importance in his trilogy. The period 1814–48 represents, in
Rosanvallon’s story, the triumph of elitist, rationalist liberalism over political vol-
untarism before the latter’s explosive return in 1848. Historiographically, Rosan-
vallon aims to recover the two post-Napoleonic monarchies as a fundamental an-
tecedent of the early Third Republic and its quasi-official positivism.76 This feature
of Rosanvallon’s thought amounts to another revision of Furet, who never assigned
such weight to the two post-Napoleonic monarchies and found few antecedents
for the “normalization” of Third Republic positivism in earlier French history.77
Moreover, Rosanvallon portrays Guizot as a vital forerunner to his own political-
philosophical project of rethinking “the relationship between liberalism and de-
mocracy.” Guizot and the Doctrinaires, Rosanvallon argues, were the first to per-
ceive that democracy is both the sole basis of and the principal threat to the new,
post-Revolution world.78 That is, they accepted that there was no turning the his-
torical clock back to before 1789 while simultaneously refusing to oppose 1789
and 1793 as discrete phenomena in order to save “the revolution in the Revolution.”
Rather, they sought to understand the relationship between 1789 and 1793 as one
internal to democracy (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 96). Rosanvallon thus con-
cluded Le moment Guizot with the statement that today we should “take a [d]etour
by way of Guizot. . . . A detour from which we will come back better than we
were to our own tasks and not lazily avoid them.”79
According to Rosanvallon, Guizot—whom Rosanvallon called both the Marx
and the Gramsci of the bourgeoisie80—had posed the right questions even if he
gave the wrong answers. It is for this crucial reason that Rosanvallon hoped to
resurrect Guizot’s thought. Guizot, like Benjamin Constant, Auguste Comte, and
pp. 203–4). See also the discussion in n. 92 below of the “Caesarism” of Louis-Napole´on and
the Second Empire.
76 See, esp., Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot (n. 54 above), pp. 358–59; and La monarchie
impossible: Les Chartes de 1814 et de 1830 (Paris, 1994), pp. 9, 11.
77 Furet pointed to Auguste Comte as an important intellectual precursor to Third Republic
positivism but not as effecting a political program; see Franc¸ois Furet, Revolutionary France,
1770–1880, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford, 1988).
78 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, pp. 13, 80. Gauchet claimed this same postrevolutionary
insight for Constant in 1980; see Gauchet, “Benjamin Constant” (n. 54 above), pp. 11–30. Lefort
reports that in his EHESS seminar he signaled the interest of Guizot and also the limits of the
image of Guizot as a reactionary and that, soon after, Rosanvallon proposed Guizot as the topic
of his thesis; Claude Lefort, interview by Samuel Moyn, New York City, Apr. 10, 2003.
79 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, p. 376.
80 Rosanvallon, “Le Gramsci de la bourgeoisie,” introduction to Histoire de la civilisation en
Europe, by Guizot (n. 59 above); cf. Rosanvallon’s entry in Dictionnaire des oeuvres politiques,
ed. Franc¸ois Chaˆtelet, Olivier Duhamel, and Evelyne Pisier (Paris, 1986), s.v. “Guizot: Des moyens
de gouvernement et d’opposition (1821).”
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other French liberals in the early nineteenth century, staked his liberalism in op-
position to voluntarist political constructivism, which he took to be the philosoph-
ical progenitor of the Terror. As a result, he challenged “the democratic utopia of
a society in which wills by themselves would be able to express and construct a
being-together.” He sought to “think the political against Rousseau,”81 to “imagine
the constitution of the social bond without recourse to the notion of the contract
and without returning to an organic representation of the social.”82 The alternative
foundation for politics to which Guizot and the Doctrinaires turned was “social
power,” a somewhat vague notion stemming from Guizot’s conviction that “the
political is grounded in the general system of social needs.” Such an antivoluntarist
grounding allowed the legislative process for Guizot to be limited, in Rosanvallon’s
words, to “recording and translating a given social and moral state: it creates
nothing that does not already exist.”83 However, the decisive historical fact about
modern “social power,” Guizot realized just as Tocqueville did much more fa-
mously some years later, was that it is an inevitably and inexorably democratic
power.84
To anchor politics in “social power,” Guizot and the Doctrinaires unfortunately
looked to the sovereignty of a reason beyond human volition, one to be discovered
by the political and intellectual elite. In so doing, Guizot continued and amplified
the French tradition of rationalist liberalism—only, for Guizot, reason would fi-
nally overcome the tension between democracy and liberalism rather than simply
check the former in the name of the latter (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 231). However,
Guizot’s apotheosis of reason entailed the rejection not only of the idea that sov-
ereignty resides in the people but also of the notion of the individual as a bearer
of rights or as possessing the liberty that results from autonomy. The Doctrinaires’
idea of the sovereignty of reason “is liberal in that it denounces all forms of
despotism and denies any power the right to call itself truly sovereign, but, for all
that, it concedes nothing to the intrinsic rights of the individual.”85 Rosanvallon of
course rejects Guizot’s hyperrationalist solution, but he strives to retain Guizot’s
postvoluntarist question.
Guizot’s and the Doctrinaires’ idea of the rule of reason necessitated a drastically
reformulated concept of representation. They rejected the interest-based represen-
tation of the Anglo-American scene and “conceived representative government
before all else as a dynamic social operator.” They thus sought to establish “rep-
resentation” as a form of political communication between society and government
in which, Guizot wrote, “society is continuously disclosed both to its government
and to itself, and the government to itself and to society.” Representative govern-
ment would become, in Rosanvallon’s words, “the context in which a society works
81 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, pp. 44–45; cf. La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 96.
82 Rosanvallon, “Le Gramsci de la bourgeoisie,” p. 15.
83 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, pp. 42–46; emphasis in original.
84 Rosanvallon writes that Guizot and the Doctrinaires anticipated Tocqueville on a range of
important issues such as the inexorable historical advance of democratic societies. See, e.g., ibid.,
p. 99, and La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 119.
85 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, p. 91; exactly the same wording can be found at Le sacre
du citoyen, p. 232, and La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 102.
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on itself and produces its identity and its unity.”86 Clearly, this is far from any
accepted or intuitive meaning of the word “representation.” It reprises, however,
Condorcet’s ideas about representation as “a continuous process of interaction and
of reflection between the people and the representatives” and anticipates Rosan-
vallon’s own normative pronouncements (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 62).87
Guizot’s alternative political architecture remained impossible to sustain, how-
ever, without the institutionalization of the exclusionary idea of capacity. In the
end, “capacity” provides the key both to Guizot’s political system and to Rosan-
vallon’s own rejection of a return to, rather than a detour through, Guizot. For
Guizot, the “faculty to act according to reason” was the most important political
qualification, and capacity-based citizenship thus became the only way to insure
the rule of reason effectively.88 Voting, in turn, was envisioned as the fulfillment
of this function rather than the acting out of a right. The end result of Guizot’s
capacity-based system was the formation of a natural aristocracy that would fuse
France’s democratic and aristocratic traditions and resolve the contradictions that
had until then riven French history. In other words, it would end the Revolution.
Rosanvallon argues that this false solution led to a version of conservatism that
sought to end the cycle of revolutions and achieve a sort of historical stasis.89
Rosanvallon’s rejection of a “return” to Guizot, however important Guizot is in
Rosanvallon’s thought, did not stem only from Guizot’s implausible appeal to
objective reason and his exclusionary idea of capacity. In addition, the elderly
Guizot abandoned what Rosanvallon bizarrely labels the “moral neutrality” of his
original conservative ideal and became the reactionary later remembered by the
French and European left (immortalized, not least, in the Communist Manifesto’s
opening lines). His desire to subsume the historical fact of democratic social power
under the enlightened direction of a political elite ultimately became, as Rosan-
vallon puts it, a “trivially reactionary platitude” that killed politics no less fully
than did monistic voluntarism.90 But, for Rosanvallon, Guizot’s subtle reflections
on the projects left after the 1790s nonetheless pioneered the framework in which
French history would have to proceed. Guizot at least attempted to think through
the pathologies of democracy and liberalism, even if his cure erred too far in the
direction of the latter. In this sense, it is plausible to view Rosanvallon’s image of
Guizot as one side of Rosanvallon’s fundamental dilemma: a pioneer (in a sense
86 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot (n. 54 above), pp. 102, 55, 57; Guizot (from Archives phi-
losophiques, politiques, et litte´raires 2, no. 7 [Jan. 1818]: 257), quoted in ibid., p. 55.
87 See n. 73 above.
88 Guizot (from “Elections,” in Encyclope´die progressive [1826]; rpt. in Discours acade´miques
[Paris, 1861], p. 385), quoted in Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, p. 95.
89 Rosanvallon, ibid., pp. 109, 114, 278.
90 Rosanvallon, Le moment Guizot, pp. 304–5. Interestingly, Rosanvallon sets up Auguste Blan-
qui as something of a parallel to Guizot, although from the opposite end of the political spectrum.
Blanqui also hated democracy but, in his case, because of a valorization of insurrectionary action.
For Blanqui and the Blanquists, in Rosanvallon’s view, insurrection “is at once a political and
social form, wholly positive in itself, and a moral posture, which makes good on the modern
imperative of freedom” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 130–31). Blanqui, for Rosanvallon, follows
a long line of such celebrations of action as the romanticization of the barricades and even the
Marquis de Sade (ibid., pp. 131–32).
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like Furet) warding off voluntarist constructivism whose response to the terror of
democracy leaves the problem of how to avoid liberal rationalism and elitism.
As Rosanvallon’s narrative of French history continues, the antidemocratic lib-
eralism of Guizot and the Doctrinaires generated an equal and opposite reaction:
illiberal democracy. For Rosanvallon, the Revolution of 1848 inaugurated a long
moment of illiberal democracy that continued through the Second Empire. His
analysis of political discourse in 1848 in Le sacre du citoyen appears under the
heading “Le sacrement de l’unite´ sociale” and focuses on what he describes as a
utopian desire to achieve social unity through universal suffrage. For Rosanvallon,
far from being an exception in the history of democracy in France, “the months
of March and April 1848 reveal some of its deepest traits,” notably, its fundamental
“illiberalism” (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 286, 288). Simply put, 1848 for Rosan-
vallon is a repetition of Jacobin antipluralist voluntaristic monism. He writes, in
tones reminiscent of his own and Furet’s descriptions of Jacobinism, that in 1848
“all dispute is perceived as a menace to social unity. . . . Pluralism is unthinkable.”
The “utopian republic” of 1848 “expressed . . . one of the most profound traits of
French political culture: the aspiration to unity and consensus in the political trans-
figuration of social ties” (pp. 292, 294).
Rosanvallon takes up the reaction of the left to the disappointment of 1848 in
La de´mocratie inacheve´e and provides an informative discussion of the suddenly
widespread calls for direct democracy. This current of thought, centered around
Victor Conside´rant, Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin, and Maurice Rittinghausen,
blamed the failure of the Second Republic on the institution of representative
government. Only direct democracy, they felt, could fulfill the ideals of 1848 and
“offer the promise of a renaissance of the republican idea and the accomplishment
of the imperative of modern politics” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 162). Rosan-
vallon’s story here takes an interesting twist: the democratic voluntarism under-
pinning these calls for direct democracy transformed into a version of antipolitical
rationalism. “The absolutization of the vote culminates in the abolition of the
political,” Rosanvallon claims, and it thereby signaled the “reversal of democracy
against itself” (p. 179). This “French ideology of simple power . . . takes root in
an implicit philosophy of the natural harmony of interests” and thus reprises the
law-centered utopian rationalism that Rosanvallon described in Le capitalisme uto-
pique (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 173–74). Charles-Bernard Renouvier, Ro-
sanvallon provocatively claims, was “only a sort of Adam Smith of the extreme
left, . . . surprisingly close to a Thomas Paine and a William Godwin, . . . [who]
believed in a possible natural harmony of interests” (p. 176).91 In sum, the most
radical democrats of 1848 turned voluntarist democracy on its head and transub-
stantiated democracy into antipolitical utopianism, thereby passing from one form
of protototalitarianism to another. Rosanvallon’s dismissal of the Revolution of
1848 is thus complete: it is latently totalitarian in all its dimensions.92
91 In Le capitalisme utopique (n. 40 above), Rosanvallon has a section on Paine and Godwin
as utopian liberals who advocated the end of politics (pp. 143–44).
92 Rosanvallon argues that the illiberal democracy of 1848 extended, in political-philosophical
terms, through the “Caesarism” of Louis-Napole´on and the Second Empire. In La de´mocratie
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Rosanvallon’s attempt to ensure that the rejection of voluntarist democracy in
Furet’s work does not simply lead to an endorsement by default of liberal ration-
alism thus did not proceed by a thorough critique of the equation of voluntarism
and totalitarianism. Instead, it proceeded by extension, by suggesting that liberal
rationalism is just as bad. The historiographical consequences of this maneuver
are immense. It not only kept Furet’s critique of totalitarianism from leading by
default to neoliberalism; it also both worsened the political challenge of modernity
tout court and exacerbated a constitutional anomaly within the revisionist para-
digm. It worsened its logic of norm and deviation. The political challenge posed
by Rosanvallon—posed in an even more challenging way than it is in Furet’s
work—is how liberalism and democracy can be brought together to avoid the
totalitarian potential latent in both. In Rosanvallon’s hands, the historical anomaly
remains “ending the Revolution”—not just the hypertrophy of the will that Furet
had sketched but also the solvent of reason that threatened to dissolve politics even
further.
“Ending the Revolution”: The Problem of Normalization
In 1871, France joined Switzerland, Andorra, and San Marino as the only republics
in Europe. For Rosanvallon, as for Furet, the advent of the Third Republic and its
consolidation signaled the Revolution’s “coming into port” and the end of “the
theater of the exceptional in France” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 228).93 Only
for Rosanvallon, in an important revision of Furet’s interpretation of the Third
Republic’s institutions as “almost totally in conformity with the republican tradi-
tion,” the Third Republic in fact owed much more to Guizot and the Doctrinaires
and to the tradition of elitist rationalism (pp. 228–29).94 Rosanvallon parts further
with Furet in painting the “positivist” solution of the Third Republic’s founders as
a failed normalization of French democracy. Rather than overcoming the long-
term crisis of French politics torn between reason and will, the “founding fathers”
of the Third Republic (Rosanvallon uses the expression repeatedly) only refor-
mulated that problem without overcoming it. Rosanvallon’s break with Furet on
this score ties Furet’s version of French normalization to a tradition that Rosan-
vallon has repeatedly presented as being just as discredited as democratic volun-
tarism. Instead, Rosanvallon locates normalization in a radically different historical
inacheve´e, he argues that Caesarism needs to be understood as “a pathology internal to the dem-
ocratic idea” that resulted in “a unanimistic vision of the political.” Rosanvallon hedges his de-
scription somewhat and also claims that Caesarism introduced “an essential rupture in the heritage
of revolutionary political culture. . . . [Caesarism’s] typically ‘Jacobin’ accents should not . . .
conceal Caesarism’s second dimension: the affirmation of the need to ‘found a civil order’ that
is more autonomous” (pp. 220, 201, 204). Rosanvallon’s claims about the Second Empire’s per-
mitting the emergence of a new civil order squares with the recent scholarship of Sudhir Haza-
reesingh (whom he cites) and Philip Nord (whom he does not cite); see Hazareesingh, From
Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy (Prince-
ton, N.J., 1998), and Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-
Century France (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
93
“Coming into port” is the phrase with which Furet ended his Revolutionary France, 1770–
1880 (n. 77 above).
94 Ibid., pp. 536–37.
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scene, in a series of extraparliamentary developments he dubs “the silent revolution
of the 1890s.” From a more general perspective, however, the problem of nor-
malization emerges here as Rosanvallon’s primary concern precisely because of
the degree to which his historiographical paradigm up to this point has presented
deviancy as the specter haunting French history. What is remarkable in Rosanval-
lon’s treatment of the later nineteenth century and early twentieth century is just
how far he views normalization as having occurred, just how fundamental a rupture
he envisions having taken place. And yet it is even more remarkable how, in spite
of Rosanvallon’s interest in recovering precedents for pluralism and healthier vi-
sions of democracy in the past, his portrayal of twentieth-century France amounts
to a diagnosis that France suffers from a disease for which there is no cure. De-
mocracy’s pathologies constantly return despite the best efforts of past actors and
present historians to leave it behind.
For Rosanvallon, following Odile Rudelle, the early Third Republic (until circa
1889) was an “absolute Republic,” that is, an uncompromising, parliamentary re-
gime based on indirect government and, in Rudelle’s words, “more an heir to the
ancien re´gime than a practitioner of liberalism.”95 For Rosanvallon, though, it was
an “impossible absolute Republic”—it was impossible, that is, that it could have
remained “absolute.”96 The founders’ republic, in his view, was transformed
through a series of extraparliamentary developments beginning in the 1890s.
“Against the usual view of the Third Republic as a regime whose basic traits
persisted over the long term,” he writes, “it is necessary to insist on the novelties
that occurred in this history. The Constitution remained the same, but the spirit of
the institutions and the political practices changed significantly between the 1870s
and the 1920s” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 249–50). This “silent revolution,”
as Rosanvallon names it, overcame the long-term crisis of French democracy and
produced what he calls, to take the different terms employed in the three books of
the trilogy, a “democracy of belonging (de´mocratie d’appartenance),” “an equil-
ibrated democracy (de´mocratie d’e´quilibre),” and a “moderate democracy (de´-
mocratie moyenne).”97 For Rosanvallon, the elitist but impossible absolute repub-
lic, anticipated by Guizot but realized by the “founding fathers,” did not “end the
Revolution” until it had been transformed through democratization from below.
Rosanvallon describes the founding fathers’ vision of the Third Republic as a
representative government with an elective aristocracy that claimed its sovereignty
from “the nation” rather than “the people.” As we have stated above, he locates
their ideas within the long tradition of antidemocratic French rationalism and
stresses the parallels between their political-philosophical vision and that of the
Physiocrats and especially Guizot (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 343–45; La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, pp. 227–41).98 The “positivist generation” is thus presented as the in-
95 Odile Rudelle, La Re´publique absolue: Aux origines de l’instabilite´ constitutionnelle de la
France re´publicaine, 1870–1889 (Paris, 1982), p. 289. See Rosanvallon, La de´mocratie ina-
cheve´e, p. 229.
96
“The Impossible Absolute Republic” is the title (our translation) of chapter 6 of La de´mo-
cratie inacheve´e.
97 See ibid., p. 249.
98 Rosanvallon seeks here to revise the traditional genealogy of Third Republic positivism.
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heritor of Guizot’s failed reconciliation of liberalism and democracy, or elitist
rationalism and popular sovereignty. In Rosanvallon’s account, the founders ac-
cepted universal manhood suffrage as an irresistible and unavoidable historical
fact, but they failed to respond to it in plausible philosophical terms (La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, pp. 238, 306; Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 331–38).99 The founders were
so determined to establish the republic as conservative and as divorced from the
legacy of 1848 and the Commune, he argues, that at the very moment in which
universal suffrage was seen to furnish the republic’s legitimacy, there was deep
skepticism about democracy and the republic was imagined “above universal suf-
frage” (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 346). Although formally more democratic, the Third
Republic began where Guizot ended.
The founders’ simultaneous endorsement and rejection of democracy was to be
reconciled in education and the Third Republic’s program of moral and civic in-
struction—what Rosanvallon refers to as “demopedic fervor,” which he sees em-
bodied in Jean Mace´ and the Ligue Franc¸aise de l’Enseignement. With the passage
on October 22, 1882, of the Ferry law guaranteeing free and universal education,
“demopedia was juridically instituted” and an apparent turning point in the history
of French democracy was achieved (Le sacre du citoyen, p. 369). For Rosanvallon,
however, the founders’ positivist valorization of education as a panacea for the
aporias of democracy only belied, rather than resolved, their equivocal stance to-
ward democracy, confirming further their status as the intellectual inheritors of the
Physiocrats and the Doctrinaires. The Third Republic’s educational regime, Ro-
sanvallon claims, aimed to create a caste of elites that would be “the equivalent
of a compensatory power and regulator of universal suffrage”—that is, a counter-
balance to the demos (p. 381). Put differently, the formation of capacite´ was in-
stitutionalized in 1882 in order to surmount the legacy of 1848 and 1871. The
attitudes of the positivist republicans represented more a return to Guizot than an
overcoming of his pioneering but problematic legacy.
French democracy was ultimately “normalized,” however, by a series of extra-
parliamentary developments that managed to accomplish exactly what had eluded
all earlier political elites: a synthesis, albeit an imperfect one, of liberalism and
democracy that avoided the totalitarian tendencies of both. In Le peuple introuvable
and in La de´mocratie inacheve´e, Rosanvallon describes in great detail “a silent
revolution in the political system”—in ideas about politics and in political prac-
tices—that lasted from approximately 1880 to 1920 but that centered on the 1890s,
which he dubs “le moment 1890” (Le peuple introuvable, p. 105; La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, p. 245). Fundamentally, and revealingly, the “silent revolution” that
Rosanvallon depicts as normalizing democracy in France turned on the expansion
Claude Nicolet, e.g., in his influential L’ide´e re´publicaine en France (1789–1924): Essai
d’histoire critique (Paris, 1982), does not treat the Physiocrats and devotes only two pages to the
two post-Napoleonic monarchies, in which he does not mention Guizot. See the discussion of Le
moment Guizot keyed to nn. 78–90 above.
99 Reformist gradualism, in Rosanvallon’s account, was not an option in the wake of “the
accident of 1848,” which had condemned France to oscillate between radical democracy and
reaction. English-style reformism was furthermore rendered impossible by “French specificity”—
that suffrage was conceived in abstract and universal terms (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 331–34).
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of neocorporatist forms and institutions that went beyond the orthodoxies of both
rationalist liberalism and voluntarist democracy. Rosanvallon’s “silent revolution”
marks a fundamental rupture in French political history, one no less significant—
indeed, perhaps more significant—than the traditional milestones of the French
Revolution, the Revolution of 1848, and the founding of the Third Republic.
In Le peuple introuvable, Rosanvallon identifies the key epistemological inno-
vation of this “silent revolution” as the acknowledgment that society has to be
understood as a conglomeration of social categories to be represented as such rather
than as incidents of a monistic unity. That is, in Rosanvallon’s (following Furet’s)
universe of norm and deviation, the French finally became more “English.” For
Rosanvallon, however, the modern democratic and individualist society does not
admit of a priori social differentiation that can then be reflected politically. For
this reason, “modern society,” as he puts it, “becomes representable only if it is
interpreted and classified in invented categories” (pp. 104–5; emphasis added).
Rosanvallon examines closely the different methods employed to achieve this aim,
such as the representation of professions, the advent of political parties, and the
use of proportional elections, and he claims that in “le moment 1890,” “the hour
of a new approach to representation, founded on the recognition and expression
of the groups structuring society, thus rang throughout society. The inherited ri-
gidities of revolutionary political culture were, for the first time, put aside”
(pp. 112–13). A key site registering this paradigm shift was the rise of the social
sciences as a discipline attempting to understand society as a diverse set of exactly
such “categories.” Rosanvallon points to the interest in medieval corporatism
within the social sciences at the end of the nineteenth century as further evidence
of the newfound interest in the representation of groups. No figure is more im-
portant here than E´ mile Durkheim, who “perfectly incarnates, at the end of the
century, this search for a reinvention of the older notion of intermediary bodies”
as well as the larger rupture in the idea of representation (p. 134).100 Rosanvallon’s
analysis here ably historicizes epistemological and political developments in re-
lation to one another while evoking, once again, his own normative commitments.
The full force of the “silent revolution” becomes apparent when Rosanvallon,
in some of the most important pages in his entire oeuvre, narrates the emergence
of modern intermediary bodies such as political parties and trade unions in Le
peuple introuvable. For Rosanvallon, in both theoretical and historical terms, such
bodies fulfill a necessary role in modern democracies, namely, the mediation of
the relationship between the social and the political as well as that between the
individual and the demos. Their advent in France in the 1890s thus marks a fun-
damental break with “French exceptionalism,” with “the old Jacobin suspicions
toward intermediary bodies” (p. 167). Moreover, Rosanvallon takes this aspect of
the “silent revolution” to stand as a rebuke to any conceptually overdetermined
accounts of the French past. “The standard indictment of Jacobinism,” he warns,
100 Rosanvallon also points to a “rupture in the method of considering political questions” and
cites the veritable explosion of studies about political parties in the work of James Bryce, Robert
Michels, Moisey Ostrogorski, and others at the turn of the century (La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
pp. 245–46).
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in a compelling and crucial passage, “should not cause us to forget that the rigidity
of principles was often silently erased before practical requirements. In the shadow
of the dominant history, which stresses the persistence of the illiberal temptation
tied to the apotheosis of the sovereignty of the people and which underlines French
exceptionalism, another more hidden history allows itself to be seen: that of the
everyday advances of representative government, bringing the French case more
in line with the other great democracies” (p. 168). During “le moment 1890,” “a
veritable general economy of representation was progressively established, chang-
ing the original revolutionary model into one that made room for complexity and
pluralism” (p. 169). The “end of the French exception,” which Rosanvallon along
with Furet once traced to the critique of totalitarianism of the 1970s and 1980s
because of its effect on intellectuals and their categories, is now considered to have
occurred in a sweeping yet silent revolution in practices almost a century earlier.101
The advent of political parties, Rosanvallon argues, enabled no less important
a development than the rationalization and institutionalization of pluralism in
French democracy. “The modern party,” he explains, “[is] a profoundly original
social form at the crossroads of a double tension: that between the individual and
the collective, on the one hand, the given and the constructed, on the other. . . .
Parties allow the differences inherent in a society of individuals to be embodied
and given shape. . . . The system of parties offers a kind of rationalized pluralism.
. . . In the democracy of parties, there is thus an attempt to invent a modern plu-
ralism, a pluralism founded on complex identities” (Le peuple introuvable,
pp. 182–83, 187). The emergence of political parties and “complex pluralism” was
underpinned by “the return to a more organic vision of the social, beginning in the
1880s, [which] contributed powerfully to rendering acceptable and imaginable a
pluralist vision of the political system. The diversity of parties can be compre-
hended, in this case, . . . as stemming directly from the complexity of the social
structure” (p. 178; cf. pp. 173–75, 186, 190).102 Rosanvallon also notes important
101 See Franc¸ois Furet, Jacques Julliard, and Pierre Rosanvallon, La Re´publique du centre: Fin
de l’exception franc¸aise (Paris, 1988).
102 Here it is worth noting a fundamental shift from his comments on political parties in the
1970s. Originally, in light of conflicts within the PS and in the name of pluralism, Rosanvallon
had drawn attention to the late nineteenth-century critique of the oligarchic tendencies of political
parties; see Pierre Rosanvallon, “Avancer avec Michels,” Faire 17 (Mar. 1977): 31–34; “Trois
textes pour un de´bat” (introducing criticism from Michels, Ostrogorski, and Max Weber of pro-
fessional politicians), Faire 35 (Sept. 1978): 55–57; and “Connaissez-vous Ostrogorski?” Faire
50 (Dec. 1979): 23–26. The last article was reprinted as the introduction to the republication of
the 1902 edition of Moisei Ostrogorski, La de´mocratie et les partis politiques, ed. and intro. Pierre
Rosanvallon (Paris, 1979). But in La de´mocratie inacheve´e, while remaining attentive to the
oligarchical effect of party politics, Rosanvallon calls it an unavoidable, paradoxical feature of
democracy itself: even as the “democratic” elements grow, so do the “oligarchic” ones. Elsewhere
he has written that “today . . . it is no longer possible to reflect on the future of political parties
from the perspective of a utopia of concord and consensus or from that of a technical resolution
of [the conflicts in] parliamentary government and mass democracy. For this reason, the political
party has become so important because it is at the heart of the problem of reorganizing democracy
and of what one could call the democratic deficit of contemporary societies” (Rosanvallon, preface
to the French translation of Introduction a` l’histoire des partis politiques, by Paolo Pombeni,
trans. Isabelle Richet [Paris, 1992], p. xvi). See also Pierre Rosanvallon, “Partis et factions,” in
Dictionnaire de philosophie politique, ed. Philippe Raynaud and Ste´phane Rials (Paris, 1996).
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conjunctural factors such as the stabilization of the republic, which allowed po-
litical opposition to be seen as nonthreatening, and the political polarization of the
Dreyfus affair. But, in the final balance, he ties the historical emergence of political
parties and thus of institutionalized pluralism in France to the arrival of an organic
apprehension of the social, demonstrating once again just how deeply his history
of French democracy is tied to his normative political-philosophical commitments.
The second major force, alongside political parties, that Rosanvallon identifies
in the “silent revolution” is the emergence of syndicalism following the legalization
of unions in 1884. The rise of syndicalism had begun in the 1860s with the emer-
gence of workers’ candidates in the 1863 legislative elections, the end of the ban
on syndicalism in 1864, and the publication of the Manifeste des soixante in 1864,
which Rosanvallon views as signaling a fundamental rupture with “the universalist
political culture resulting from the French Revolution” because it embodied a “par-
ticular” interest rather than the abstract general interest (Le peuple introuvable,
p. 72). Moreover, for Rosanvallon, syndicalism also made the important creative
contribution of questioning extant models of political representation and offering
the alternative idea of “representativity.” While conceptually and juridically im-
precise, syndicalist “representativity” was “the artifice that makes possible” the
affirmation of the corporatist identity of social groups and the establishment of
syndicates as their legal representation “while leaving unbroached the question
whether the syndicate is, in the technical sense of the term, the representative or
the organ of the workers’ group” (p. 251). This syndicalist revision came about
by way of an attack on democracy as “de´mocratisme”—as individualist and in-
capable of representing the real interests of French workers. Furthermore, it arose
from a suspicion that representative government as practiced in France was cre-
ating a class of professional politicians apart from the masses, a critique directed
as much against the socialists as against the more centrist republicans (pp. 222–
27). French socialists, Rosanvallon relates in Le sacre du citoyen, had become
during this time the leading apostles of universal suffrage in France, making “the
advent of the pure individual-voter the condition of the realization of the demo-
cratic ideal . . . [and of] the transformation of the republic into socialism”
(p. 387).103 The syndicalist movement challenged the socialists on exactly this
ground, with syndicalist theoreticians such as Georges Sorel and Hubert Lagardelle
reviling socialist party machinations. “At the very moment when socialists drew
closer to the republican ideal,” Rosanvallon explains, “syndicalism wanted to offer
an alternative perspective to those disillusioned with universal suffrage, radical-
izing, in a certain way, the aspiration to worker separatism of the 1860s” (Le peuple
introuvable, p. 221).104 For this reason, Rosanvallon views “representativity” as
103 It is important to note that the socialist love affair with universal suffrage did not last; by
the early 1900s the socialist left, and then later the PCF, in a reprise of the republican left following
the disappointment of 1848, placed the future revolution “above universal suffrage” (Le sacre du
citoyen, pp. 389–90); cf. Pierre Rosanvallon, La question syndicale: Histoire et avenir d’une
forme sociale (Paris, 1988), pp. 214–36, suggesting that syndicalism must finally make peace
with electoral democracy.
104 For Rosanvallon, this moment carries longer-term historical significance as “the foundational
distrust of socialist parties in French syndicalism finds its source” in the founding attacks launched
by Sorel and Lagardelle (Le peuple introuvable, p. 223).
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having played a vital role in the establishment of an “equilibrated democracy” at
the turn of the century, a contribution too easily lost in the syndicalist tradition’s
reputation for extraparliamentary and often violent action. For Rosanvallon, the
syndicalist claim to a separate social voice, by “the sole fact of its existence,”
consecrated “a new mode of social representation” that vitally contributed to “the
progressive construction of an equilibrated democracy” (p. 253).105
Nevertheless, the particular form of the syndicalist contribution to pluralism is
criticized by Rosanvallon for having been a backward-looking, even rearguard
action. Unfortunately, the group identity claimed by syndicalists began with “a
social given and not a political construction. . . . One can speak in this way of a
sort of return to an essentialist conception of representation” (Le peuple introu-
vable, p. 231). This claim betrayed what Rosanvallon sees as the modern need for
elective rather than enforced social identity. In his analysis of syndicalist essen-
tialism, Rosanvallon draws out a connection between the syndicalist project and
the writings of Guizot that illustrates both Rosanvallon’s normative project and
how he knits together in his own thought a disparate set of resources from French
history: “Revolutionary syndicalism paradoxically takes up reactionary criticisms
of universal suffrage. It often only repeats, in giving them ‘left’ content, the prej-
udices against the power of le nombre developed many times by Guizot or Royer-
Collard at the beginning of the nineteenth century and by Taine and Renan some
decades later” (p. 232). But the leftist reinvention of Guizot’s perspective did
nothing to correct its democratic deficit. As Rosanvallon explains, “The substan-
tialist vision of democracy tends, in the final reckoning, to revive archaic ap-
proaches to the social . . . [and] leads to a veritable negation of democracy”
(pp. 232, 235). While syndicalism’s advent “powerfully contributed to counter-
balancing the foundational sociological deficit of the French political model”
(p. 257), and thus figures in his story as a key break with the Jacobin idea that
political will can create the social, it nonetheless did so only at the high price of
a regressive political approach that takes social reality as a given that politics
should then passively reflect.106
Another major development of “the silent revolution” that Rosanvallon heralds
as a challenge to the monistic political imagination inherited from the Revolution
is the birth of “a consultative administration” and what Rosanvallon views as the
105 See also the similar analysis offered in Rosanvallon, La question syndicale, pp. 97–118.
106 Rosanvallon’s interest in the contributions and limits of turn-of-the-century syndicalism is
not surprising in light of his biography. The question left for syndicalism by its originary advent,
Rosanvallon has continued to argue in his recent programmatic work on the subject, is how it can
reinvent the victory for pluralistic representation that it achieved in its early years without risking,
as it did in its original articulation, a reversion to a superannuated conception of the social.
Rosanvallon concluded his book on syndicalism by recommending that syndicalism now “clarify
its relationship to the democratic idea,” suggesting that it move from “representation” to “impli-
cation”—he defined this transition, somewhat vaguely, as a replacement of “a culture of mobi-
lization” with one of “management,” not in a spirit of “conquest of society” but rather of “par-
ticipation in the movement of democracy itself” (ibid., p. 194; and see pp. 249–58 [“L’enjeu
de´mocratique”] and 183–95 [“D’une sociologie a` une politique de solidarite´”]). Rosanvallon
credited the CFDT as “the organization that has contributed most to the renovation of forms of
representation” (p. 254).
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establishment of a form of corporatist state during the interwar period. Rosanvallon
dates the emergence of the “consultative administration”—he takes the term from
the institutionalist legal thinker Maurice Hauriou—to the creation in 1891 of the
Conseil Supe´rieur du Travail, whose advent symbolized the silent revolution’s
“discreet rupture with the abstract universalism of 1789” and the “much broader
movement of redefining the relations between state and civil society at the end of
the nineteenth century” (Le peuple introuvable, pp. 257, 261). The consultative
administration symbolized a “modest” state seeking multiple modes of represen-
tation between state and society, a development that recalls Rosanvallon’s descrip-
tions of Condorcet’s and Guizot’s ideas of representation and that Rosanvallon
narrates as a crucial break with “the old conception of an Omniscient State, at
once guarantor and guide of the general interest hanging over society” (p. 262).
The First World War greatly accelerated this process and thrust issues of economic
competence into the nation’s political life to the point that, in 1916, a state eco-
nomic council was proposed in order to give a political role to economic experts.
In 1925, the Economic National Council (CNE) was created, and by 1934 Paul
Ramadier was pointing to its abundant representative capacity and calling for it to
become (in Rosanvallon’s words) “the genuine social site of the debate between
different opinions and of the search for the general interest” (p. 275). In this vision,
corporatist representation would complement parliamentary representation and, as
Rosanvallon sees it, the increasingly consultative administration did in fact lead to
something like a corporatist state between the two world wars, one that he takes
pains to dissociate from Vichy’s later, full-blown corporatism—thus saving cor-
poratism from guilt by association.107 Rosanvallon’s interest in the pluralization of
channels of representation between society and state in these developments is rem-
iniscent not only of Condorcet’s and Guizot’s ideas about representation as a form
of communication between state and society but also of Rosanvallon’s own pro-
grammatic proposals.
A last central feature of the “silent revolution” was the emergence of the welfare
state amid calls for “an industrial democracy,” which Rosanvallon views as mark-
ing the full emergence of economic issues into political discourse, the extension
of the idea of emancipation onto “economic terrain.” “The turn is fundamental. . . .
Envisaging the management of economic issues in terms elaborated in the political
domain was completely foreign to the revolutionary political culture” (La de´mo-
cratie inacheve´e, p. 339). This politicization of economic issues took various
forms. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, for example, had wanted to “reimagine the politi-
cal system on the model of the workshop,” while Jean Jaure`s and Jules Guesde
saw the achievement of socialism as a natural extension of the republican ideal
(pp. 341–43). The specific call for an “industrial democracy” did not take off until
after the Great War and was centered around the CGT’s demands for economic
rights before radicalizing into Maxime Leroy’s demand for a democracy of pro-
ducers rather than citizens (p. 353). At the same time, Rosanvallon has written
107 Rosanvallon argues that interwar corporatism, understood as a complement to parliamentary
rule, is “profoundly different” from the corporatism that Vichy made “a global alternative” to
democracy (Le peuple introuvable, p. 276).
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elsewhere, the CGT during the 1920s and 1930s called for a program of nation-
alization, which Rosanvallon interpreted as the rationalization of the economy
along social-republican lines. Nationalization thus “translates the social-republican
political culture onto the economic plane. . . . The idea of industrialized national-
ization undertakes a recovery of two essential questions: that of the establishment
of a rational economy and that of how the general interest will be formed and
expressed.”108 The end result of these demands, in Rosanvallon’s narrative, was “a
new economy of the political in the 1920s” (p. 354).109
Thanks to this amalgamation of extraparliamentary democratizing forces, the
revolutionary crucible was finally broken, the threats of rationalism and volunta-
rism finally mastered.110 The details of Rosanvallon’s account of the “silent revo-
lution” add up to the larger endeavor of turning Furet’s way of thinking about the
history of democracy—and the version of normalization that this paradigm pro-
poses to secure society against the totalitarian impulse—in new and more demo-
cratic directions. The historiographical payoff of Rosanvallon’s extended treatment
of this multifaceted “silent revolution” is his resituation of the numerous extra-
parliamentary developments he narrates in the long-term narrative of French his-
tory, assigning them an entirely new meaning as the crucial forces in the normal-
ization of French democracy. In Rosanvallon’s view, only the permanent agenda
of French history to break the revolutionary mold—confronted by Condorcet,
limned by Guizot after the Revolution, but only truly begun in the “silent revo-
lutions” of the Third Republic—explains the significance for the theory and prac-
tice of democracy of these seemingly disparate historical events. While Rosan-
vallon’s account breaks in detail with Furet, it is still a narrative of the French
Sonderweg and its—at least partial—cure.
The Return of Pathology and the Need for Democracy
In spite of the silent revolution, Rosanvallon’s story does not have a happy ending.
His surprisingly brief account of the twentieth century is devoted, startlingly, to
the arguments that France managed to avoid totalitarianism throughout the interwar
era but then, after the threat of actual totalitarianism waned, proceeded to lose
whatever immunity it had acquired to the founding pathologies of modernity. As
Rosanvallon’s narrative comes to conclusion in the years of his own life, the effects
of the historiographical paradigm he adopted on the democratic hopes he originally
sought to sustain within it become particularly clear.
Rosanvallon’s interpretation of totalitarianism is highly indebted to the writings
of Hannah Arendt and especially Claude Lefort, in which totalitarianism is defined
108 Pierre Rosanvallon, “L’ide´e de nationalisation dans la culture politique franc¸aise,” Le De´bat
17 (Dec. 1981): 10. Rosanvallon sees this program continued in postwar planification and in
Mitterrand’s 1981 nationalizations (ibid., passim, esp. p. 14).
109 A more detailed analysis of the emergence of the welfare state is given in Rosanvallon,
L’E´ tat en France (n. 65 above), pp. 184–95.
110 Other aspects of the “silent revolution” that Rosanvallon details in La de´mocratie inacheve´e
and Le peuple introuvable are what he calls “the silent revolution of the mandate,” the “second
birth of public opinion,” “the question of the referendum,” and the growth in modes of “deci-
phering” society through gathering information and statistical analysis.
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by both Nazism and Leninism-Stalinism; Rosanvallon presents both as pathologies
or perversions of democracy, and thus as internal to it (La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
pp. 365–66).111 Rosanvallon’s principal concern in this section of his trilogy, how-
ever, is to explain how France and French democracy resisted totalitarianism. His
discussion takes the form of a tacit challenge to recent historiographical currents
that insist on the susceptibility of the home of the rights of man to totalitarianism,
and he exonerates France from the charge that it had always been too weak a polity
to avoid succumbing to mid-century illiberalism.112 Rosanvallon identifies three
principal causes of this resistance. First, the silent revolution of the 1890s opened
important avenues through which dissatisfaction could be expressed without threat-
ening the parliamentary system itself. More fundamentally, it broke with the rev-
olutionary heritage, which, Rosanvallon hints, might otherwise have facilitated the
adoption of the totalitarian menace. In the wake of the silent revolution, he writes,
“The enlargement of the public space and the forms of political expression . . .
contributed to blunt a good number of criticisms directed against the parliamentary
system. . . . This was an unstable and highly imperfect framework but one that
nonetheless allowed the surpassing of the old and fatal alternative between resigned
consent to the inertia of a closed order and the illusions of completely starting
over. The principal merit of this regime is, in this respect, to have allowed the
linkage of parliamentarism and democracy for the first time in French history” (La
de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 357–58).
Second, Rosanvallon insists more ironically on a particularite´ franc¸aise that
inured the country to the totalitarian virus: its indigenous illiberalism. Paradoxi-
cally, France’s illiberal tradition “contributed in an essential way to the equilibrium
of the French political model. It allowed republican political culture to play on
two fields at once. Republican political culture reassures the right by its democratic
moderation, while it remains in connivance with the left by its illiberalism. The
length of the Third Republic is not unconnected to this distinctive political alloy”
(La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 364). Rosanvallon’s analysis here shows the extent
to which normalization in his eyes remained incomplete. “Republican monism”
may have allowed France to resist the deeper illiberalism of totalitarianism, but it
also showed once again for Rosanvallon that illiberalism is always lurking in
France’s shadows.
Finally, Rosanvallon points to the international environment as the third factor
111 Rosanvallon offers an analysis of totalitarianism in La de´mocratie inacheve´e, where he
devotes eleven pages to these two “abysses of the twentieth century” (pp. 365–76). His discussion
of the Soviet Union is considerably fuller than that of Nazi Germany, which he explicates, save
one reference to Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will in a footnote, solely through the writings
of Carl Schmitt. For Rosanvallon, “the oeuvre of Carl Schmitt offers here a convenient point of
observation on the conceptual genesis of this second pathology of democracy” (La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, p. 372).
112 In response to the contemporary historiography of fascism as represented most prominently
by Zeev Sternhell, which evaluates the penetration of fascism in France based exclusively on the
study of intellectuals, Rosanvallon properly observes that “left to itself, the history of ideas can
be misleading,” for “the image of an interwar period dominated by totalitarian regimes and to-
talitarian thinking corresponds to only one part of reality” (ibid., pp. 377–78).
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that saved France from the totalitarian threat. After the Great War, the international
triumphalism regarding “democratic civilization” made people in France feel se-
cure in their de´mocratie moyenne, which increasingly defined itself in opposition
to the growing totalitarian menace. This “negative” democracy found its intellec-
tual mouthpieces in Hans Kelsen, Karl Popper, and Joseph Schumpeter in the 1930s
and 1940s, each of whom theorized democracy as “a purely procedural vision of
political legitimation” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 380). Between the wars, Ro-
sanvallon argues, democracy ceased to designate a sovereign people and came to
mean nothing more than “the inverse of dictatorship” and, paradoxically, “a regime
protective of liberties” (p. 380). “Negative democracy” thus saved France from
totalitarianism.
As a leftist, one hoping to remain in communion with the autogestion ideal of
his youth, Rosanvallon of course cannot rest content with negative democracy, in
spite of its role in erecting a guardrail against a French totalitarianism. Rosanvallon
offers a political and theoretical critique of negative democracy: it is not democratic
enough. He rejects the apparent reconciliation of liberalism and democracy offered
in these figures’ “realist theories” as “flat, Churchillian democracy” and insists that
democracy retain the aspiration to empowerment (La de´mocratie inacheve´e,
pp. 364–65). Furthermore, Rosanvallon argues that the resolution of the conflicts
pervading the history of democracy, particularly the emancipatory pressure it
places on liberalism, had to be lived out and discovered practically rather than
theoretically defined away as the clarification of a liberal baseline. “Would the
conception of a negative democracy finally close all of the debating and groping?”
Rosanvallon therefore asks. “Would it allow the democratic idea to enter finally
into the peaceful waters of the liberal port?” His answer is direct and resolute: no.
For even once a “lucid caution before the abysses that line the way [of politics]
with utopias and easy ways out” became internalized to the democratic ideal,
thanks to the negative conception of democracy, “the desire of men and women
to be masters of their own fate kept returning.” In an explicit rejection of his
colleague Pierre Manent’s Straussian vision, Rosanvallon reports that postwar his-
tory amply shows why “it has always been impossible to rest content in the thought
that ‘loving democracy requires loving it within limits.’”113 Consequently, the in-
terwar and postwar liberal rejection of totalitarianism could never provide the
complete formula for democracy (pp. 383–84).
Yet Rosanvallon’s theoretical assumptions provide no clear way of defining the
historical origins of his own democratizing wish—and arguing on its behalf to-
day—except as a final return of modernity’s pathologies, as if the advancement
of liberal democracy were always to be seen as synonymous with curing it. Though
voluntarism and rationalism were largely discredited by history, the modern indi-
vidualism that led to both outlived the solution that the turn of the century pio-
neered. On Rosanvallon’s account, France continued to search in the tracks and
live on the legacy of the moderate or equilibrated democracy that persisted “hardly
upset from the interwar period.” For this reason, Rosanvallon freely affirms, cov-
113 Pierre Manent, Tocqueville et la nature de la de´mocratie (Paris, 1982), p. 181, quoted in La
de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 384; cf. n. 33 above.
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ering the period after World War II in one page, that “there is nothing intellectually
notable to report about these years.” The statesmen and technocrats of the period
merely updated the consultative state and planning bureaucracy and touched up a
paradigm that had not yet fallen (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 384–85). In these
years, France’s normalization remained incomplete, with “revolutionary monism
. . . always waiting in the shadows, ready to return and make the weight of its
founding role felt” (Le peuple introuvable, pp. 311, 313).114 Moreover, even
France’s acquired immunity to pathology began, as time passed, to give way. In
French postwar planification, he suggests, “finally reposed the hope of overcoming
the limits of traditional politics.” This bureaucratic and technocratic solution went
far beyond industrial planning, for it “was intended to bring about the double utopia
of a rational government and a renewed form of representation,” thus squaring the
inherited French circle of reason and will through the agency of enlightened and
public-minded bureaucracy. Planification, a solution made impossible by the
events of 1968 and the origins of a new and participatory vision of democracy,
represented at once the fulfillment and the obsolescence of the equilibrated or
moderate democracy (pp. 320–21). Though challenged in l’aˆge de l’autogestion,
the French exception survived until the end of the 1970s in part because self-
management—Rosanvallon admits in hindsight—never discovered a means of
instrumentalizing and articulating institutionally the alternative it championed. It
took the crisis of the 1980s, rather than the utopias of the late 1960s and 1970s,
to upset the stopgap equilibrium for good (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 387–89).
“The contemporary malaise,” Rosanvallon avers, “must be understood in this light
as a result of the erosion since the 1970s and 1980s of this equilibrated democracy”
(Le peuple introuvable, p. 21).
The contemporary return of pathology is above all a recrudescence of the very
individualism that for Rosanvallon defines modernity itself. To be sure, for Ro-
sanvallon, democracy understood as a voluntaristic triumph of the will stands dis-
credited: “It is above all a metaphysics of the will that has fallen away at the end
of the twentieth century,” Rosanvallon concludes.
It is now quite simply impossible to continue to think about democracy on the theo-
logicopolitical basis on which it has always implicitly proceeded. It is not for certain
that “all concepts of political theory are secularized theological concepts,” as Carl
Schmitt maintained. But as far as the general will is concerned, it is. The Social Con-
tract well understood the new power of men as a laicized form of God’s power, called
like the original to create a people. And it supposed that this will could not take form
unless society assumed the shape of a unified body and a personalizable totality. It is
this view that has now been discredited. . . . It is now necessary to conceptualize [the
sovereignty of the people] in radically desacralized terms, in a break with the earlier,
114 While he is careful to reject the reductive vision of “an eternal and undifferentiated French
Jacobinism,” Rosanvallon explains the postwar refusal to conceive of parties as the best means
to embody democracy as the effect of this persistent monism. In effect, Rosanvallon never broke
with Furet’s own metaphor of voluntarism as alcoholism: once an addict, always one (Furet,
Interpreting the French Revolution [n. 1 above], p. 70).
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demiurgic imaginary that always nourished the democratic project. (La de´mocratie
inacheve´e, pp. 396–97)
But the collapse of democracy understood as voluntarism is leading today, Rosan-
vallon argues, to the collapse of the democratic impulse in all possible forms—a
cure no better than the disease for which it was discovered. In his most recent
book-length effort at programmatic theory, The New Social Question, Rosanvallon
argues that the excessive progress of individualization in the contemporary West
has endangered any thought of the collective good, the death of totalitarianism
having so far implied the death of solidarity. The progress of social individuali-
zation remains, for Rosanvallon, still following Dumont, the central theme of both
modern and recent history.115 Only now it has superseded its promise as a bulwark
against totalitarianism and emerged as a major, if not the major, threat. In contrast
to Furet, who regretted that America had begun to sacrifice its liberal victory over
democratic terrorism, Rosanvallon rejects the United States as having sacrificed
democracy itself, since it is now “shaped by radical individualism and the figure
of the victim,” which has led it to become “an assembly of quasi nations satisfied
to establish a simple modus vivendi.”116 Rosanvallon warns that these develop-
ments should tempt no one to “renounce the project of making human history (or,
at least, of mastering it)” (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, pp. 396–97). It is an error, he
insists, to respond to the obsolescence of the will by accepting a minimal or neg-
ative definition of democracy. The contemporary revitalization of democracy,
rather, must begin with the question of how to rethink society after the violent
destruction of totalitarian unity and the individualizing disintegration of the stop-
gap and ramshackle equilibrium that served France as it temporized through the
115 The overall weight Rosanvallon assigns to the long-term, inexorable advance of individu-
alization is demonstrated in the section of Le sacre du citoyen in which Rosanvallon discusses
the conditions that led to the late enfranchisement of French women, who were not allowed to
vote until 1944. Appealing to Dumont to suggest that “political equality marks the definitive entry
into the world of individuals,” a “point of no return,” Rosanvallon rejects traditional explanations
for the timing of women’s enfranchisement in France and suggests that it must relate “to the
philosophical and political foundations of [the French model of] the right of suffrage” (pp. 14,
395). The reason for the tardiness of women’s enfranchisement is not, for Rosanvallon, either the
force of Catholicism (other Catholic nations granted to women the right to vote far earlier) or the
republican fear, in the guise of the French Senate, of women’s conservatism (republicans in other
nations overcame the same fear) (pp. 393–95). The true explanation for the late date of 1944, in
Rosanvallon’s account, is the long-term difficulty of understanding women as individuals. For
Rosanvallon, “the victories of English or American suffragettes, for example, . . . fit with the
dominant logic in their countries of interest representation and required no philosophical rupture”
(pp. 404–5). The enfranchisement of women in France thus took place not through the slow
inclusion of another group but through a gestalt switch whereby women were reclassified as
individuals; cf. Rosanvallon, “L’histoire du vote des femmes: Re´flexion sur la spe´cificite´ fran-
c¸aise,” in Femmes et histoire: Colloque, la Sorbonne, 13–14 novembre 1992, ed. Georges Duby
and Michelle Perrot (Paris, 1993).
116 Rosanvallon, The New Social Question (n. 2 above), pp. 36–37. The evolution of John
Rawls’s work from an emphasis on justice to an emphasis on toleration is seen by Rosanvallon
as indicative of a larger turn away from solidarity on the American scene.
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twentieth century. Solidarity without totalitarianism, partially and briefly achieved
in the past, is what those interested in democracy must now long for and seek out.
CONCLUSION
Pierre Rosanvallon’s accomplishment as a historian is among the most important
and impressive of recent decades. Our emphasis here has been on the way in which
Rosanvallon’s early career shaped the history of French democracy he tells. But
one might suggest, more evaluatively, some limits to that vision. Rosanvallon’s
continuing hope for democratic solidarity, born of his early career, came to be
excessively defined by the rejection of the totalitarianism to which, for biograph-
ical, political, and conceptual reasons, he linked it. In this regard, it is interesting
to note a major shift within Rosanvallon’s trilogy that seems to illustrate his own
perception of a need to return to the 1970s’ quest for solidarity as the limits of the
emphasis on totalitarianism have become apparent. The two concluding volumes
of his trilogy, published, respectively, in 1998 and 2000, arguably mark an im-
portant transformation in Rosanvallon’s thought, a belated return to his point of
departure in the 1970s and, specifically, to the insistence on democratic empow-
erment that so strongly informed his writings on autogestion. It is no coincidence
that La de´mocratie inacheve´e, the final volume of his trilogy, is the one most
directly concerned with democratic empowerment, while volume 1 is the most
preoccupied with “French exceptionalism.” Indeed, in Le sacre du citoyen the
comparison with the English interest-based path is rarely absent, and Rosanvallon
suggests that French democracy did not fully mature until the Fifth Republic or
even “the end of the 1970s” (Le sacre du citoyen, pp. 390, 455).
But in the succeeding volumes, there is a change afoot, signaling a more fun-
damental strain against Furet’s paradigm. Rosanvallon highlights the silent revo-
lution of the 1890s and after as the key moment for both the normalization of
democracy in France and the end of French exceptionalism, and furthermore as
the first real positive historical resource offered by French history for rethinking
democracy in the present.117 With only moderate hyperbole, one could say that it
is only halfway through volume 2 of his trilogy that, for the first time in the three
volumes, Rosanvallon notes a successful deviation from France’s Sonderweg; until
then, everything is trapped in French exceptionalism (or, in the case of Guizot and
other nineteenth-century liberals who posed the right questions, a wish for “nor-
mality” that went unfulfilled). It is thus fair to read Rosanvallon’s more recent
volumes as an attempt to return to his original concerns and to break with the
obsession with pathology that characterizes his middle works. Quite significantly,
before their publication Rosanvallon predicted that only with the final two volumes
of his trilogy would “the kind of continuity that stretches between what I wrote in
the 1970s and my current work become clear.”118 Whether he followed a trajectory
117 As discussed above, Condorcet and, to a lesser extent, Brissot are exceptions to this absence.
Both, of course, were killed in the Revolution.
118 Rosanvallon, “Te´moignage” (n. 12 above), p. 376.
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deliberately intended from the beginning or one constructed after the fact, Rosan-
vallon’s recent work clearly returns to his early animating concerns.119
But is Rosanvallon’s turn (or return) too little and too late to save his narrative
from its entanglements with the problem of curing rather than the problem of
advancing democracy? Does Furet’s paradigm have to be entirely surpassed before
a return to the democratic past in the name of its future is possible? The question,
in light of the difficulty of principle that Furet’s totalitarian theory of democracy
leaves behind—namely, the omnipresence of threat and the seeming impossibility
of normalization—is whether a more promising story of democratization in mod-
ern times would have to begin with a different theory of democracy, according to
which it is not pathological from the beginning and to the core.
It is therefore worth asking: Does the democratic past as Rosanvallon recon-
structed it cast meaningful light on its possible futures? Or, to put it differently,
would a different history provide more meaningful light? It is these questions, in
the final analysis, that have to be raised in response to Rosanvallon’s endeavor,
especially if one takes his work on its own terms. Rosanvallon’s historical survey
of French democracy, it seems clear, is ultimately better at explaining why some
potential historical resources should be excluded than it is at establishing which
of those that remain should be revivified. His history of democracy in France
amounts to the discovery of three grand imperatives. There is, perhaps above all,
the remembrance of the terroristic potential in democracy and therefore of the
liberal moderation it must internalize. Second, there is the recognition that ration-
alist liberalism is the obverse and secret ally of voluntarism, with the consequence
that the rejection of “pure” democracy must not erect in its place a perpetual-
motion machine that expunges conflict from social life through the alignment of
interests. Finally, between these two extremes, there is Rosanvallon’s insistence
on the pursuit of democratization now that it has stalled, rather than the acceptance
of a flat “negative democracy” that has been inherited. But these three imperatives
define democracy only negatively. They mark the borders beyond which liberal
democracy should not err, but they fail to chart a clear path through the remaining
territory. While it is clear that Rosanvallon values citizen activism, especially in
its corporate forms—and it was just this kind of activism that lay behind the silent
revolution of the 1890s, in which he puts so much stock—any positive program
in his work is, at best, rather vaguely limned. In this manner, Rosanvallon has
devoted the vast bulk of his effort to defining the possible de´rives of liberal de-
mocracy rather than to searching for alternative resources. For an endeavor dedi-
cated to democratizing liberal democracy, there is surprisingly little effort to mine
French history for alternative constitutional arrangements more friendly to de-
mocracy; no search in the annals of the past for different ways of organizing and
119 In this regard, it is telling that Gauchet, the most important defender of the Furetian ortho-
doxy, has recently insisted, in apparent reference to Rosanvallon, on the continued exceptionalism
of French political culture, writing that the late nineteenth-century “liberalization of the Republic,
the advent of an autonomous civil sphere based on free association,” with civil society, political
parties, and trade unions, in fact “conspired” to “nourish the cult” of Rousseauean voluntarism,
“the collective power in the state,” and “the absolute eminence of public control” (Marcel Gauchet,
La religion dans la de´mocratie: Parcours de la laı¨cite´ [Paris, 1998, 2001], pp. 61–62).
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managing the workplace that would make it a more genuine embodiment of dem-
ocratic ideals; no discovery in French history of alternative, more democratic
modes of living out everyday life and existing in common with others than those
that have prevailed in recent times. Given his own stated allegiance to revitalizing
contemporary democracy, and given his prodigious historiographical production,
this absence is striking and, in some respects, amounts to the denial of history as
anything more than a “negative” enterprise.
In light of these observations, it is pertinent to ask if Rosanvallon’s historical
work solved, or repeated, the quandary of the second left. It is worth wondering
whether Rosanvallon’s turn to history overcame the constitutional defect that he
himself identified in the second left: its failure to supplement its negative program
with a more positive vision. In the hands of Franc¸ois Furet, the critique of totali-
tarianism was extended back in time to a critique of the French Revolution, which
Furet made out to carry within itself the seeds of all future totalitarianisms. This
interpretive paradigm may have proved as paralyzing for Rosanvallon as it has
been enabling. It may so far have precluded Rosanvallon from finding a way
beyond that critique toward a more positive vision of democracy and thus toward
his own stated goals. Longing for a positive content for democracy, yet disabled
by the primarily negative identity of the second left, which was always much more
certain of what it was against than of what it ought to be for, Rosanvallon may
remain too close to where he began. In this regard, Rosanvallon’s choice of Gui-
zot’s thought as the point by which liberal democrats should today take a detour
is instructive. Rosanvallon was originally attracted to Guizot’s perception that no
return to prerevolutionary ways existed and that a new, internal regulation of de-
mocracy had to be found. Yet a turn to such a patently antidemocratic theorist for
the renewal of democracy seems a choice with limited potential. Here, it is fair to
view Rosanvallon’s attention to Guizot as overdetermined by the critique of total-
itarianism and attention to the pathologies of democracy and as underinformed by
his commitment to democratic revitalization.120 In the same vein, while Rosanval-
lon struggled against Furet’s enabling paradigm for the history of French democ-
racy, attempting to turn it in new directions from within, one may legitimately
wonder whether Rosanvallon in the end found himself hobbled in the pursuit of
his most cherished ends by the very starting point he adopted—whether his rejec-
tion of totalitarianism made the solidarity for which he longed too elusive and
dangerous ever to be more than a distant and heuristic ideal. It is illuminating, in
this regard, that while he came to deny—against Furet—that a “totalitarian” un-
derside seemed the most remarkable fact about French politics in the twentieth
century, Rosanvallon never turned his back on Furet’s retrojection of this threat
120 Indeed, the growing appreciation of some of the costs of the antitotalitarian coalition that
brought together such different political aspirations is undoubtedly one factor in its recent dis-
solution in the affaire touched off by Daniel Lindenberg (and apparently instigated by Rosanvallon
himself); see Daniel Lindenberg, Le rappel a` l’ordre: Enqueˆte sur les nouveaux re´actionnaires
(Paris, 2002), published in La Re´publique des Idee´s, a series edited by Rosanvallon. See also Jean
Birnbaum and Nicolas Weill, “Ce livre qui brouille les familles intellectuelles,” Le Monde (Nov.
21, 2002) and Birnbaum’s interview with Rosanvallon, “‘Il faut refaire le bagage d’ide´es de la
de´mocratie franc¸aise,’” Le Monde (Nov. 21, 2002).
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deep into French democratic history and into the nature of democracy itself. Con-
sequently, the French Revolution remained all but pure pathology in Rosanvallon’s
trilogy and permanently under the sign of a taboo, essentially off-limits in his
attempt to mine the past in search of present alternatives. More important, Rosan-
vallon often writes as if the Revolution contaminated subsequent French history
to the point that there was no way out of the maze.
Rosanvallon’s unusually sweeping and provocative historical synthesis stands
as an invaluable source for historians of modern France and modern democracy.
It is not inappropriate to judge it, however, in light of Rosanvallon’s insistence
that the point of studying the past is to examine it for signs of the future—in this
case, the future of democracy. “If the aˆge de l’autogestion could pass, a time of
renewed democratic exigency has nevertheless persisted,” Rosanvallon wrote in
2000, stressing the endurance of the solidaristic vision of his early career beyond
the collapse of the vehicle it originally took (La de´mocratie inacheve´e, p. 416).
Has Rosanvallon’s historical enterprise given reason to hope for the satisfaction
of this exigent need? It would seem, especially in light of Rosanvallon’s own
insistence that democratic theory not content itself with a baseline, in the manner
of “negative democracy,” that the answer to this question so far must be, on the
whole, negative. Rosanvallon’s project of elaborating a robustly democratic liberal
democracy persists. To judge Rosanvallon against so stringent a criterion is, of
course, to hold him to an impossibly high standard, but it is his own criterion.
Most important, then, Rosanvallon’s intention outlives his performance. All future
interventions on the history of French democracy will have to take his formidable
oeuvre as their starting point. But they will also have to keep in mind the difficulties
to which his daring attempt to revise Furet’s revisionism, to revive democracy on
the basis of its thorough critique, led him in his narrative of French democracy.
Most of all, then, Rosanvallon’s project raises the question of whether it is fruitful
or futile to revise revisionism, and whether, in the name of democracy, the exag-
gerated fear of democracy has to be permanently left behind.
